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Abstract 
 
My thesis concentrates on the distinction between pro tanto reasons and all-
things-considered judgments, and their relation to normative justification. 
Negatively, it seeks to show that a prevailing kind of account of this relation 
should be rejected, namely that family of views which takes it that every 
reason has an associated weight, and the truth with respect to any issue is 
established by which set of reasons is weightiest. Through an examination of 
Ross’ doctrine of prima facie duties, this discussion also leads to a 
formulation of the central problem which any account of this relation must 
seek to solve. Positively, this thesis develops a new account of the relation 
between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgements, based on 
the fundamental insight that a justification of normative propositions is 
identical to an explanation of their truth, were they to be true. I defend this 
identity claim, and seek to generate an account of justification from an 
account of explanation. 
 
Drawing on a deservedly popular ‘contrastive’ conception of explanation in 
the philosophy of science, I show how we can fruitfully think of justification 
as itself contrastive. Part of this is showing how the notion of a burden of 
explanation can shed light on the notion of a burden of justification, so a 
conception of justification emerges according to which a justification for a 
normative proposition consists in an solution to all those burdens of 
justification which it incurs. In turn, this feeds a conception of reasons, and 
their role in justification, alternative to that envisaged in a weighing model: 
pro tanto reasons determine the correct all-things-considered judgment 
insofar as they determine to what extent the truth of that judgement has an 
adequate explanation, such that the correct all-things-considered judgement 
is just that judgement whose truth would have a fully adequate explanation. 
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Reasons and Justification 
 
We make normative claims: claims about what anyone of us should do, 
should feel, or what we should believe. How can anyone justify such claims? 
There are two questions here. What calls for justification? How can 
justification itself answer this call? A start to the second question is that 
justification requires reasons. We can justify normative claims only by 
showing that there are reasons that count in favour of their being true. For 
example, we can only justify the claim that it is wrong to prank the insecure 
by adducing the reasons for it, namely that doing so inflicts severe 
psychological torment, and is almost never funny. An improvement on this 
formulation is that we can justify normative claims only by showing that all 
the reasons, taken together, count in favour of their being true. So, even 
though by refraining from pranking the insecure one excludes them from 
more ‘normal’ elements of social interaction and so from a social in-group, 
still, taken together with the fact that doing so inflicts severe psychological 
torment, these reasons overall suggest that it is wrong to prank the insecure. 
What then does it take for the reasons to ‘overall’ count in favour of some 
claim? This opens up two lines of inquiry. The first investigates what reasons 
are and how they work. The second investigates how we need them to work, 
given what justification requires of them.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Initially I will demarcate more precisely 
what phenomenon I mean to focus on within what is ordinarily called 
‘justification’. I will then argue that justification of normative propositions 
(as opposed to other possible objects of justification) forms a distinctive kind 
in that justification of this kind is also explanation. On the basis of this 
equivalence I then set up the fundamental problem this thesis aims to 
confront, which concerns the structure of justification. 
‘Justification’ is polysemous: one thing it means is the act or process of 
justification, something that occurs at a time and place, carried out by a 
justifier, to another or to themselves. ‘Karl justified himself to his boss in the 
common room and was out in time for lunch’ is an example of this use. 
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Throughout this thesis, however, I will be concerned with another use of 
‘justification’, justification as the abstract entity which is argued over or 
thought about.1 (The word ‘thought’ appears to work much the same way.) 
‘Was there a justification for Karl’s actions?’, ‘Karl’s justification for his 
actions was that he was getting the firm the best deal he could’, ‘How are 
justifications structured?’, these are examples of ‘justification’ used this way. 
This is how I will use ‘justification’. Using both senses, we could say when 
we engage in justification, we aim to lay out an adequate justification in such 
a way that the person to whom the justification is addressed accepts it as 
adequate. It is important to distinguish this from a third use where 
‘justification’ is a property of propositions, or beliefs, consisting in the degree 
to which they are justified, a sense of ‘justification’ which I shall not use.2 
Another clarificatory point concerning my use of ‘justification’: even with 
justifications in the abstract sense, there is a way in which justification is 
relative to the epistemic state of the inquirer. If your evidence 
overwhelmingly points to Captain Scarlett’s being as destructible as normal 
humans, when in fact he is not, then we might say that relative to that 
evidential state, there is a justification for using a gun if one were to try to kill 
him. I do not doubt that this is a sensical use of ‘justification’, but still, when 
I talk of justification, I will always mean a justification detached from any 
relativity to evidential state, justification tout court. So, for instance, the fact 
that pranking the insecure inflicts severe psychological torment on them is 
the justification simpliciter for it’s being wrong to do it. This is not to say that 
justification cannot depend on facts about one’s evidential state, but merely 
that the justification itself does not take one’s evidential state as a parameter. 
When we talk of the adequacy of a justification we are usually talking about 
justification in the abstract sense. An justification is adequate when it is 
supported by the reasons. With ‘Karl justified himself to his boss, giving 
                                                          1 Conceived in this way, justification is the kind of thing to which a non-trivially formulated Identity of Indiscernibles might apply: justifications are the same just in case they have the same intrinsic properties. If two justifications purport to justify the same thing with the same reasons, they are the same justification. 
2 Justification is used in this way in ‘Transmission of Justification and Warrant’, Moretti, Luca and Piazza, Tommaso, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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adequate reasons’, it does not follow that Karl adequately justified himself to 
his boss. Whether Karl adequately justified himself to his boss depends on his 
boss’ level of uptake. If Karl gives his boss adequate reasons but his boss is a 
dolt and rejects the justification, then it will follow that there is an adequate 
justification for Karl’s actions (and Karl had it) even though Karl could not 
adequately justify himself to his boss. Bound up with notions of the adequacy 
of a justification is the maximal use of ‘justified’, meaning ‘fully justified’. 
To use ‘justified’ in this sense is to imply that the thing which is justified is 
fully justified. If something is adequately justified, then I use that to mean 
that it is fully justified. There is even a sense in which a justification fails to 
be a justification at all if it is not adequate: one might express scepticism about 
a purported justification with the phrase ‘That’s not really a justification.’ 
What counts as a justification depends on the kind of inquiry being pursued. 
Suppose two detectives are in a murder investigation, and one says ‘The 
Colonel is the culprit.’ The other detective asks for a justification. The first 
one replies, ‘He had a motive, and his fingerprints were on the murder 
weapon, and no-one else had a motive, and no-one else could have had 
anything to do with the murder weapon.’ This is a pretty good justification. It 
shows that the Colonel is almost certainly the culprit. A belief to that effect 
would be thereby vindicated; giving up that belief would be denied 
vindication. The relevant criterion here is truth indication. What made it a 
justification was that it indicated that it was true that the Colonel committed 
the crime. This seems platitudinous. 
When justifying one’s actions, in contrast, the relevant criterion for a 
justification is whether the action was right, legitimate or advisable. If Karl 
sells all the stock to a single bulk buyer at an inflated price, resulting in a high 
revenue but no potential repeat customers, for a justification of his actions to 
be successful it would have to show that it was a good move to make the deal, 
that the deal does not deserve to be regretted. Action descriptions are truth 
assessable: ‘Karl got the firm the best deal he could’ might be true or false. 
But to justify one’s actions, as opposed to justifying a claim about what those 
actions were, is to show that they were right, legitimate or advisable (or 
possibly something else: I wish to impose no restriction). Again, this seems 
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platitudinous. This point applies more broadly: this criterion for a justification 
also holds when it is social arrangements being justified, or when justifying 
one’s own existence. 
What is the relevant criterion of a justification for normative propositions: 
propositions with a normative subject-matter? For example: ‘It is good when 
people don’t have to bottle up their emotions’, or ‘Perfidy should be 
absolutely forbidden.’ This is (prima facie at least) truth-assessable so we 
might well think that the relevant norm of a good justification is truth 
indication, as with justification for non-normative propositions above. But ‘it 
is right that people engage in poverty relief’ is more closely linked to action, 
so we might think that, for this example, the norms of justification consist in 
showing the action of engaging in poverty relief to be right or legitimate. 
Similarly with propositions such as ‘A high level of piety is best in a 
population.’ The concern with social arrangements might suggest that the 
relevant criterion of a justification for such propositions is whether the 
arrangement referred to therein is right, legitimate or advisable. These would 
suggest that the criterion of a justification for normative propositions is, in 
general, for that which the proposition concerns to be shown to right, 
legitimate or advisable3. This would also be a natural, if not inevitable, 
consequence of meta-ethical views according to which the expression of a 
normative proposition can itself be understood as an action which bears no 
relation to a truth-assessable content. 
                                                          3 Propositions concerning what we ought to believe are included as well, though their inclusion is slightly more problematic: an initially plausible criterion of adequacy for a justification for a proposition about what we ought to believe is what we should believe if it it’s true. In contrast, a good justification for a claim about how we ought to act doesn’t consist in showing that the action is true—this is meaningless—so it looks as though we are forced to draw a distinction between the norms of justification for propositions concerning how we ought to act, and those for propositions concerning what we ought to believe. But it’s not true that we ought to believe something iff it’s true. All kinds of other considerations may intervene. We shouldn’t believe every true proposition, for the sake of conserving memory or attention (e.g. see ‘Clutter Avoidance’, p.15, in Harman (1986)). Furthermore, there may be specific cases in which it’s better to believe a falsity: say one is going into an important exam, it may be better for one’s nerves and thereby one’s performance if one believes that the exam is not very important. Whether one can knowingly believe falsities is a different question, but that does not refute the point that one ought to believe it if one can, say if one is not aware that it is in fact very important. 
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Normative propositions, then, appear to be stuck between these two 
platitudes. So a question emerges here over what is the correct construal of 
justification for normative propositions in general, if indeed there is an 
entirely general and unified kind of justification for all normative 
propositions. 
What demarcates normative propositions is a certain criterion for what counts 
as a justification for them; but this justification must be more than truth 
indication as it was with the standard non-normative propositions. A starting 
indication for this lies in the case of using the moral testimony of another. 
Suppose someone believes that it is good when people spend their lives 
engaging in poverty relief, and we ask them for a justification of this claim; 
and they replied that the justification was that a wise person known to them 
says so. That person is reliable on the issue, so if they say so, it must be true. 
But this is an inadequate or inappropriate justification. Indeed it is not really 
a justification at all. There is an aspect in which it is a successful justification; 
ex hypothesi the wise person is reliable on this issue and the speaker is guided 
to the truth in taking up what they say. But that the wise person knows is not 
a justification for the truth of the claim; rather, if a justification for its truth 
exists at all, it must exist before it is possible for them to know and to 
communicate that knowledge. Hence the speaker has failed to give us a 
justification by mentioning the wise person’s knowledge. 
We may be tempted to think (in line with much of the literature on moral 
testimony4) that what has gone wrong is that there is a defect in the person 
using the justification, for example, a failure to make their own decisions and 
judgements. But consider the following case. Suppose we are having a 
discussion and someone we know to be wise, and reliable on this issue, claims 
that it is good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief. We 
ask him what the justification is for that. He replies that he has just given us 
a justification, namely his testimony. 
This is an unreasonable or infelicitous response. When we were looking for a 
justification, we were looking for something further, something which isn’t 
                                                          4 E.g. Nickel (2001), Hills (2009), Crisp (2014) 
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provided merely by his providing testimony and giving us reliable (though 
defeasible) evidence that it really is good when people spend their lives 
engaging in poverty relief. Here the inadequacy of the justification provided 
by testimony cannot be traced back to a defect in a person using the 
justification, for, not having yet taken up the testimony, we are not yet using 
the justification, so there is no defective person. Therefore the testimony must 
be intrinsically unfit to be a justification, even if it reliably indicates the truth. 
There would not merely be something amiss with us if we took up this 
testimony; the testimony itself is amiss as a form of justification. 
A clarification of the above argument. When a wise person tells us that it’s 
good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief, this doesn’t 
work as a justification of that claim. But it does work as a (perhaps partial) 
justification of the claim that we ought to believe that it’s good when people 
spend their lives engaging in poverty relief. It’s good evidence that that claim 
is true; supposing that it’s important enough to bother remembering, which it 
is, then it is indeed true that we ought to believe that it’s good when people 
spend their lives engaging in poverty relief, for the reason of the wise person’s 
testimony. But it is important not to confuse justification of belief with a 
justification of what is believed. 
These cases mark a contrast between the normative and the non-normative. 
Take the non-normative analogue of the first kind of case. If someone 
believes that Hovertank 3D is the first game to use ray-casting technology, 
and their justification for this claim is that they were told so by someone who 
reliably knew about the issue, there is no problem with this, no aspect in 
which it is inadequate as a justification. As for the second kind of case: 
suppose we are wondering whether Hovertank 3D is really the first game to 
incorporate ray-casting technology. Someone we know to be reliable on this 
issue tells us that it is. This is a perfectly adequate justification of the claim 
that Hovertank 3D is the first game to incorporate ray-casting technology. If 
one were to ask the giver of testimony for a justification or proof of that, it 
would not be obviously unreasonable for them to reply that they had just been 
given a justification: the testifier says so, and ex hypothesi they are reliable 
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on this issue. So truth indication appears to suffice in such cases as the 
relevant norm of a good justification. 
We may still be inclined to think that whatever peculiarity is going on here, 
it is one confined to the case of moral testimony, and therefore must be traced 
back to some feature of testimony itself. But we can broaden beyond the case 
of testimony, to a wider class of evidential connection that I shall call 
‘incidental connections’.  
Suppose we modify the above scenario to one of counter-testimony. Someone 
we know to be reliably wrong tells us that it’s good when people spend their 
lives engaging in poverty relief. We can’t make sense of why should be wrong 
so consistently. Still, we find that that’s what they are, and we conclude on 
inductive grounds that they are a reliable source of indirect information on 
the truth. We might infer from their remark that it’s probably not good at all 
when people spend their lives in pursuit of it. 
Again, though, this is not a justification of the claim that it’s good when 
people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief. If someone presented with 
this reliable counter-testimony then asked what was the justification for the 
claim that it’s not good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty 
relief, it would be unreasonable or infelicitous for someone to retort that they 
had just been given a justification. It’s not just counter-testimony, either: any 
incidental connection would be inadequate as a justification.  
Suppose I know from experience that good actions tend to be those Ted 
happens to enjoy doing. Again I’m not sure why Ted should enjoy doing 
them; I know for sure that it’s not because Ted thinks that they are the right 
thing to do and enjoys doing the right thing. Rather, Ted just seems to enjoy 
them peculiarly. So I conclude on inductive grounds that when I see Ted 
enjoying doing something that I should conclude, or at least suspect, that it’s 
a good action. Then I see Ted spend his whole adult life engaging in poverty 
relief with that peculiar enjoyment he gets when he does something right. I 
conclude that it is good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty 
relief. But I don’t yet have a justification for that claim merely by having that 
evidence. 
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Again, both of these contrast with the non-normative case. If someone is 
reliably wrong as to who directed what film, then they may be an indirect 
source of information as to who did direct which films. Apart from the 
unreliability of this evidence, there is no further problem. And were Ted to 
enjoy doing things which, it turned out, were likely to generate a lot of income 
for Ted, then again I could have a justification of what was financially best 
for Ted based on what Ted actually does; and apart from the unreliability of 
this inductive evidence, there is no intrinsic deficiency with this as evidence.  
What was missing in the above cases that accounts for the extra element in 
justification of normative propositions, besides truth indication? Return to the 
case when a wise person, when asked for a justification of the claim that it is 
good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief, replies that 
they have just given us a justification, namely their testimony. This was 
inadequate. What this shows is that truth indication, as the criterion of a 
justification for normative propositions, is misguided. Rather, when we want 
a justification, we want the reasons why it’s true, if it is, that that it’s good 
when people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief. Call this the Identity 
Thesis. 
Moral testimony can be an appropriate part of a justification for a normative 
claim in some circumstances, particularly those where there is some 
constraint on reason-gathering. Say one is in a case where one has only a very 
limited amount of time to decide what one should do. In these circumstances, 
it is legitimate, even right, to take up someone’s testimony as to what one 
should do, assuming they are reliable. In such a case, it can be a justification 
for what someone does that they were told reliably that they ought to have 
done it. This does not refute my view, but confirms it: in such a case, it is 
because they were told reliably that they ought to have done it that they had 
sufficient, even conclusive, reason to do it. Again, the justification displays 
the reasons why there was sufficient or conclusive reason for them to do it. 
So this point should not undermine the earlier thought experiment or the 
Identity Thesis. 
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What we want when we ask for a justification of the claim that it’s good when 
people spend their lives engaging in poverty relief is not only for an indication 
of the truth of that claim. What we want is an account of the grounds of that 
truth, if it’s true—grounds without which it would not be true, grounds which 
explain why it is true. Only this makes for a true justification of a normative 
proposition. In non-normative cases it obviously sometimes happens that we 
want an explanation of a truth: why did the Colonel commit the murder? But 
to ask for an explanation of this is not to ask for a justification for its truth, 
and vice versa. What marks out normative propositions as distinctive is that, 
for them, a justification is an explanation. 
An example to illustrate the Identity Thesis. Why is perfidy absolutely 
forbidden? Because any possibility that a surrender has perfidious intent 
makes it rational for the enemy to have a take-no-prisoners policy. It 
undermines a system of surrender worth keeping. This reason justifies the 
claim that perfidy should be absolutely forbidden. The reason indicates that 
the claim is true. But it also gives the grounds for that truth in giving reasons 
for it. The normative claim is conceived as true for those reasons. Perfidy is 
forbidden for the reason that it undermines surrender, because it undermines 
surrender. 
My argument above that justifications are best conceived of as explanations 
relied on two intuition pumps. Intuition pumps are a very risky kind of 
argument. Apart from the risk that the reader will simply not share those 
intuitions, there is a danger that even if they share those intuitions, perhaps 
they do so for the wrong reasons. Perhaps when it is unreasonable for 
someone to characterize their own moral testimony as a justification for some 
normative claim to someone looking for a justification of that claim, this is 
really just a condition of conversational relevance. Someone who receives 
moral testimony and then asks for additional justification is wanting 
justification that goes beyond that testimony, so the testimony wouldn’t 
qualify as a relevant kind of justification. This need not imply that it’s 
constitutive of justification that testimony or counter-testimony is excluded. 
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I therefore offer an additional argument here as to why both testimony and 
more general incidental connections should fundamentally fail as 
justifications. Regarding testimony, someone who gives testimony that one 
ought to φ requires a justification before themselves that one genuinely ought 
to φ (if that claim requires justification at all), and clearly their own testimony 
cannot be part of that justification. So there is a sense in which, even if a wise 
person testifies that one ought to φ, that just staves off the question of what 
the ultimate justification for that is. The justification provided by testimony 
is parasitic on the ultimate justification, and in that sense it is deficient as a 
justification: it doesn’t give us the real reasons why one ought to φ, or why 
some x is good, etc. 
A structurally similar argument can be offered regarding the evidence 
provided by incidental connections, such as a reliable connection between 
what a particular person says about norms and the truth of the opposite of 
what they say. If it is a genuinely incidental connection, then if there is at all 
a justification for the truth of the opposite of what they say, it is a justification 
independent of them saying it. So again there is a sense in which the fact that 
there is a reliable connection between what they say and the truth of the 
opposite just staves off the question of what the justification for that truth is. 
The ultimate justification is knowable independently. That the ignorant 
person says the opposite doesn’t give us the real reasons; it is deficient as a 
justification. 
Why don’t both of these arguments carry over to the case of non-normative 
justification, with false consequences? After all, it’s not as though someone’s 
testimony that the Colonel is the culprit would be a poor or deficient 
justification. But here they might have a justification which they cannot share 
with the person they give testimony to. Perhaps they saw the Colonel commit 
the murder. The closest other people can come to this justification is through 
their testimony that they saw. The justification the testifier has may be 
unshareable. So the justification for the Colonel’s guilt which consists in their 
testimony may be the best justification there is; it doesn’t stave off the 
question of what the ultimate justification is. With justifications for normative 
propositions, in contrast, it is difficult to conceive of a justification which is 
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unshareable in this way. I can’t think of any examples, anyway: if the reason 
it is wrong to prank the insecure is because of the torment it causes, that is a 
justification one can share directly.  
Regarding the case of an incidental connection in the case of a non-normative 
justification, things are similar. Suppose that a particular detective is 
consistently wrong about who the culprit is in the cases they investigate. It 
may turn out that the killer is so competent that they have got rid of every 
other scrap of evidence. There may be no more evidence for their being the 
killer other than the sheer fact that a particular detective known to be reliably 
wrong has denied it. (Admittedly this wouldn’t pass the test of reasonable 
doubt). So it may not be the case that a better justification is being staved off. 
The incidental connection may be the best evidence we have. So it cannot be 
fundamentally deficient on the grounds that there is always a better, more 
ultimate justification. For propositions with a normative subject-matter, in 
contrast, there is no analogue of disappearing evidence. If the reason it is 
wrong to prank the insecure is because of the torment it causes, there is no 
sense to made of the possibility that that reason might just disappear and no 
longer be useable as evidence (leaving aside the separate possibility, of 
course, that the reason might turn out to be a bad reason, or based on a false 
assumption).  
The Identity Thesis says that for a normative proposition to be (ultimately) 
justified just is for its truth to be explained. To have a (ultimate) justification 
for a normative proposition just is to have a putative explanation of its truth, 
to be able to give grounds for its truth. More, this is peculiar to normative 
propositions; the identity of justification and explanation of truth does not 
hold for the non-normative case or the case of action. This claim needs 
clarifying in some more ways. 
First: justifications give the grounds of a normative truth. But what is the 
notion of grounding here? It is that required by explanation. What I claim 
fundamentally amounts to this: for normative propositions, an adequate 
justification of them is an explanation of why they hold. So to give the 
grounds of a normative truth is to explain why it holds. 
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We can conceive grounds on an analogy with causes5, and moreover, as 
species of a common genus. If c is the cause of e, then c is something because 
of which e happens. E depends on c. We can think of causes proper (and 
grounds as well) as one species of a more general genus of dependency 
relations. Many dependency relations are not causal. If Xanthippe’s being a 
widow at t2 depends on Socrates’ having died at t1, it is notorious that this is 
not causation proper6. There are other constitutive dependency relations: a 
conductor’s being hot depends on its particles having a high average level of 
kinetic energy. This is not causal either. We should see normative dependency 
relations as just one more type of non-causal dependency relation. 
Second, the equation of justification and explanation does not entail that one 
is only justified in believing a normative proposition just in case one has a 
justification for it. That this is not so is shown by the case of moral testimony 
used above. There, one is justified in believing the relevant normative 
proposition, that it is good when people spend their lives engaging in poverty 
relief on the basis of a wise person’s testimony to that effect. But this is not 
to have a justification of that proposition.  
Another reason justification of belief in a normative claim comes apart from 
justification of a normative claim stems from the possibility that some 
normative truths are intuitively knowable, delivered by a moral sense or 
something similar. If there is a moral sense, and I intend to be neutral on this, 
then one may be justified in believing the deliverances of that moral sense; 
it’s reliable and so on. But even if there were a moral sense, then one would 
not have a justification of the deliverances of that sense merely by being 
subject to them. To have a justification of those deliverances, one would in 
addition need to formulate grounds for why the deliverances of one’s moral 
sense should in fact hold. 
Thirdly, this claim needs to be distinguished from a different claim that is 
sometimes made in the philosophy of action, for example by Davidson7, that 
                                                          5 I owe much of this section to the discussion in chapter 7 of Ruben (1990). 
6 It is often called ‘Cambridge determination’: see, for example, Ruben (1988). 
7 See Davidson (1963) 
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the justification (or ‘rationalization’, the word which Davidson uses) of an 
action is what explains it, because the reasons for which an agent performs an 
action are the causes of his action. If this is true, then this is a sense in which 
justification is explanation. But this is not what I mean when I claim that 
justification is explanation, because I am talking about the justification and 
explanation of normative propositions and truths rather than actions. To 
justify a normative proposition is to explain why it is true, but to justify an 
action is not to explain why it is true; that’s meaningless. Hence the 
importance of distinguishing. 
Fourthly, the status of the identity of justification and explanation needs 
clarifying. It is not prescriptive in the sense that when people justify 
normative claims, what they should be doing is trying to give an explanation 
of the truth of those claims. Nor is it descriptive in the sense that when anyone 
gives a justification for a normative proposition, what they are in fact doing 
is trying to give an explanation of its truth. Rather, the claim is that if anyone 
has a justification for a normative proposition, what they have is an 
explanation of its truth. What it is for a normative proposition to be adequately 
justified is for its truth to be explained. 
Earlier I claimed that justification requires reasons. But what is a reason? 
After making some general points about reasons, I will set up an explanatory 
challenge. Resolving this challenge, I argue, is a requirement on any adequate 
account of reasons. 
Every reason counts in favour of a particular claim’s being true. That a reason 
‘counts in favour’ of a claim is one of many locutions that have roughly the 
same meaning. We say that X is a reason ‘for’ a conclusion or that it ‘weighs 
in favour’ of that conclusion; that in a list of reasons some belong in the ‘pro’ 
category with respect to a particular conclusion, as opposed to belonging in a 
‘con’ category; and some have said that a reason to φ entails that one ‘pro 
tanto ought’ to φ, meaning that as far as that reason goes, one ought to φ. 
Reasons of this kind figure in justifications. To justify the claim that it’s 
wrong to prank the insecure, it’s necessary to adduce reasons. One might 
bring to bear the likelihood of upsetting them, the likelihood that they will 
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fail to recover quickly, and the likelihood that given the above any prank will 
fail to be funny. The above three considerations serve as reasons which 
collectively justify the claim that it’s wrong to prank the insecure.  
Any reason is based on a fact which ‘serves as’ a reason. In the above 
example, it’s the fact that pranks will likely upset the insecure that serves as 
a reason for not pranking them. For the reason to be valid, the fact on which 
it is based must indeed be a fact. No false claim can serve as a valid reason. 
If it were simply false that the insecure are unlikely to find pranks funny, then 
that would not be a genuine reason for it’s being wrong to prank them. 
To say that reasons which count in favour of a particular claim are the basic 
elements of a justification for that claim does not yet settle the question of 
how the justification is to proceed. A particular problem arises over cases 
where there are reasons which count in favour of competing claims. In virtue 
of what should the reasons, taken as a whole, recommend one and only one 
as the proper verdict? We cannot explain why simply by saying there were 
reasons in favour of that verdict, for there were reasons against it too. We had 
this scenario in the case of pranking the insecure. Although there were reasons 
both for and against that claim, it was reasonably clear that pranking the 
insecure is wrong (other things being equal, of course). But why should it be? 
It seems there must be some other feature, in addition to the reasons, that 
explains why things should fall out in favour of one verdict but not the other. 
What is this feature? Any adequate account of the relation between reasons 
and justification must say what. Furthermore, in light of the Identity Thesis, 
this feature of justification is thereby a feature of explanation of normative 
truth. Why, in scenarios of conflicting reasons, things should fall out one way 
rather than another, then becomes specifically an explanatory challenge— 
one which tries to say why a particular normative truth should hold rather than 
a competing one, on the basis of the reasons.  
One popular kind of view for answering this explanatory challenge is 
specified in terms of a metaphor of weightiness. Reasons weigh in favour of 
claims, conflicting reasons weigh against each other, and all the reasons taken 
together collectively weigh in favour of one claim or the other or none at all. 
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Roughly, whichever of the competing propositions have the weightiest set of 
reasons in favour of it, that proposition is justified by the reasons (where there 
is no weightiest set of reasons, no verdict is justified). There are two principal 
versions of this story which I will now describe. 
One is the ‘balance of reasons’8. According to this ‘absolutist’ conception, 
every reason is associated with a certain ‘weight’: a reason’s weight is one 
and the same as the extent to which it counts in favour of a particular claim’s 
being true. We can assess the weight of the overall case for a particular 
claim’s being true by aggregating the weights of the reasons which count in 
favour of that claim’s being true. After doing the same for all the competing 
alternatives, we are to select the weightiest overall case. Roughly, the 
conclusion of the weightiest overall case is the justified conclusion9. In the 
example above, the reasons in favour of not pranking the insecure, that it is 
likely to upset them and not to be funny, outweigh the reason against, that it 
represents its own peculiar form of exclusion. 
The second conception, which I shall call the ‘relationalist’ conception, 
denies that every reason is associated with a certain weight, and instead 
affirms that reasons bear relations of being weightier than to other reasons. 
This relation is supposed to be transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric, and 
sometimes to be complete10. On this view, crudely, a claim is justified just in 
                                                          8 The balance of reasons conception is explicitly endorsed by Broome: the metaphor of balance is introduced in his discussion of ‘weighing explanations’ on p.52 of his Rationality Through Reasoning (2013), and defended throughout the rest of that chapter. It is a little less explicit in Skorupski. Skorupski lays out an absolutist (in my sense) conception of the strength of reasons on p.36, but doesn’t appear to mention balance. The metaphors it invokes are pervasive outside philosophy. John Horty quotes (see p.3 of Horty (2012)) correspondence from Benjamin Franklin which indicates that he may have not only endorsed this conception, but used it in everyday life (though it may be ambiguous between the balance of reasons conception and the relationalist conception. 
9 Subtleties should be introduced when dealing with cases where overall there is some reason to do X, but not enough. See p.38 of Skorupski (2010) 
10 For instance, see Broome’s attack on the possibility of incommensurability in his Weighing Lives (2004). 
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case the set of reasons in its favour is weightier than the set of reasons in 
favour of each and every competing claim.11 
The weighing model needs to answer the explanatory challenge which arises 
concerning in virtue of what one of two competing normative propositions 
for which we have reasons should count as the proper conclusion to draw 
from those reasons. Its answer must be: it is in virtue of one set of reasons 
being the weightiest set. Weight thereby figures as an explanatory notion in 
this view12. At first pass there seems something unsatisfactory about this 
conception: uninformative and empty.  
Moreover, the weighing model sheds no light on when justification is needed. 
Rather, it takes for granted ideas of when justification is needed: when there 
are competing claims to decide between which we need to go to the reasons. 
Every normative proposition competes in this sense with its own negation in 
that one cannot accept both. But I do not think it is obvious that every 
competition in this sense needs justification, that every normative proposition 
                                                          11 This second conception is explicitly endorsed by Schroeder: “I will define the weight of a set of reasons not by establishing a correspondence between sets of reasons and some further thing—amounts of weight—but by defining a partial ordering on sets of reasons: the weightier-than ordering.” (p.126-7 of Slaves of the Passions (2007)). John Horty’s application (see especially chapters 1 and 2 of Reasons as Defaults (2012)) of default logic to the structure of justifications is arguably a notational variant of this conception as I argue in the appendix to a later chapter. Finally, something like this conception has been recently endorsed by Scanlon11 though he rejects the correlative claim that being weightier than is a logically primitive relation between reasons. According to Scanlon, reasons bear weightier than relations to other sets of reasons, but all this literally means is that the weightier set is one from which we can draw the justified conclusion; here, there is no claim that weightier than relations play any role in determining the justification. (See the definition of ‘outweighing’ on p.108 of Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). Also on p.111 he says ‘The strength of a reason is an essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular reasons.’) 
 
12 However, one might also think with Scanlon that weightiness is not an explanatory notion so much as an accountancy one. To have a certain weight property simply means that if it is the weightiest the conclusion it endorses is correct. Because it’s defining of weights, on this view, there is no sense in which weights explain why a certain conclusion is correct. To do that, what it is to be of a certain weight has to be defined separately from the consequences of having weights. Scanlon’s account of weights therefore is not apt to answer the explanatory challenge. 
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(if it is true) needs a justification as to why it should be true over its 
contradictory. 
This leaves us with a task. To what extent can the weighing model answer the 
explanatory challenge? How does it fail, if at all? I will explore these 
questions in the next chapter. I also explore in more detail the assumptions of 
the explanatory challenge. I argue that the origin of the explanatory challenge 
lies in the work of David Ross, and that Ross’ particular commitments make 
the weighing model seem natural. The work in the chapters after that is 
partially a refashioning of these commitments. In the next chapter I also 
criticize the weighing model’s answer to the explanatory challenge, and argue 
that we should look elsewhere. 
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The Weighing Model: Origins, Motivations and Problems 
 
According to the weighing model, what determines the justified conclusion 
when there are competing reasons in play are the weight properties of those 
reasons and their relations to each other. The justification for the right 
conclusion consists in the reasons and their weight properties concatenated 
correctly. This characterization is incredibly abstract, so I in this chapter I will 
make it less abstract by discussing each version of this view separately. I do 
not have a master argument against this family of views, though I do have a 
debunking explanation of why this family of views exists. So, first, I’ll 
motivate a certain way of thinking about the issue of justification within 
which the above family of views seems attractive, and draw a moral about 
why they are inevitably flawed. Then I’ll discuss each one in turn: what 
should emerge is a series of problematic, unsatisfactory views. So this should 
suffice to motivate the rejection of the entire family. 
W.D. Ross arguably put forward the first view of this kind in this 1930 book 
The Right and The Good. Several important points emerge from a 
consideration of this view, which is why it will occupy us for a while. The 
discussion is important in a variety of ways. Firstly, Ross lucidly set up a 
genuine problem which it is helpful to regard the weighing model as trying to 
solve: so it gives us a standard by which to evaluate the success of those 
views. Whenever those views appear in print, they are not thoroughly 
motivated, so it is to Ross that we must turn to find a suitable standard of 
evaluation. It is also a problem I expect my view to be able to solve, so it is 
important on that account also. This problem is precisely a version of the 
explanatory challenge I set up last chapter. The discussion of Ross serves two 
purposes, then. First, it clarifies the explanatory challenge and motivates it 
more thoroughly. It turns out that there are two main ideas underlying the 
challenge: the idea that reasons form an irreducible plurality which cannot be 
cashed out in terms of a common kind, and the idea that conflicts between 
reasons are rationally, or at least determinately, resolvable. Secondly, the way 
Ross seeks to establish these claims itself leads on naturally, if not inevitably, 
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to the weighing model, even though Ross himself (as I will show) was 
somewhat ambivalent in this respect. Moreover, the sheer stature of Ross 
makes it probable that his discussion was widely read and his ideas 
influential: so Ross is potentially of genealogical interest, especially with 
reference to how close he comes to endorsing some kind of weights 
framework. 
Ross’ concern with the structure of justification arises from his sense of 
inadequacy with the utilitarianism of Moore and Rashdall,13 according to 
which ‘all ‘conflicts of duties’ should be resolved by asking ‘By what action 
will most good be produced?’’.14 Ross thinks that if an act is to be one’s duty 
then its dutifulness must be grounded in something other than in its tendency 
to promote the most good. Even if it is one’s duty to perform a certain act 
because it produces the most good, that is only because the action is right qua 
its property of having the tendency to produce the most good, not because of 
the results of the act: 
‘That which is right is right not because it is an act, one thing, which will produce another thing, an increase of the general welfare, but because it is itself the producing of an increase in the general welfare…we have to recognize the intrinsic rightness of a certain type of act, not depending on its consequences but on its own nature.’15 
So Ross considers the various descriptions under which a particular act may 
fall. An act under some of those descriptions may be wrong, under others 
right (other things being equal): an act under the description ‘breaking a 
promise’ is intrinsically wrong, under the description ‘promoting the most 
benefit to others’ intrinsically right. These because, respectively, we have a 
general duty to keep promises, and a general duty to promote the most good. 
This thought puts Ross in a position to articulate the real source of his 
dissatisfaction with utilitarianism: 
‘[Utilitarianism] says, in effect, that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possible 
                                                          13 P.18 of The Right and the Good (1930) 
14 P.19, ibid. 
15 P.47, ibid. Ross is avowedly influenced by Prichard’s ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ (1912), which receives an explicit mention in the preface. The thought that oughts can be derived only from oughts and not from the good is articulated in that paper. 
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beneficiaries of my action….They may also stand to me in the relation of promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband….and the like; and each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according to the circumstances of the case.’16 
Ross clearly thinks that the fundamental ethical thoughts utilitarianism admits 
are too few: acts are nonderivatively right under more descriptions than 
merely ‘promoting the most benefit to all’. For instance, one might reasonably 
think of an act that it is right since it means keeping a promise, without having 
reached any conclusions about what good it will bring. This is key to Ross’ 
subsequent criticism of utilitarianism: for Ross, utilitarianism is refuted 
precisely by the fact that sometimes what makes an act prima facie right does 
not make it prima facie likely to bring about more good than the alternatives17, 
even if it is actually right. What a consideration of the prima facie makes clear 
is that rightness and optimality are not equivalent, as Ross’ utilitarian claims.  
Ross claims that our actual duty is derivative on our prima facie duties. 
‘Whether an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally 
significant kinds it is an instance of.’18 Under some of these prima facie 
duties, some performable actions will be right, under others wrong. This gives 
us a sense in which prima facie duties conflict: they favour competing 
verdicts. But actual duties exist nonetheless. So the question is left open as to 
how to resolve conflicts between prima facie duties. 
A general argument can perhaps be drawn from Ross’ remarks on 
utilitarianism. A principle for resolving conflicts between prima facie duties 
would have to take the form ‘It is right that we φ’, where φ stands for an 
action under some general description e.g. promote the most benefit to all. 
But any such principle is simply equivalent to saying that it is always our duty 
to φ, which means that it cannot coherently appear that it is ever our duty to 
do something other than φ. It then follows that it there can be no prima facie 
duty to do something other than φ, since a prima facie duty is the kind of duty 
that is apt to be our actual duty. So any principle for resolving conflicts 
                                                          16 P.19, ibid. 
17 P.36, ibid. 
18 P.20, ibid. 
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between prima facie duties in favour of one particular duty effectively rules 
out the other prima facie duties from being prima facie duties at all. And this 
is inconsistent with the facts of moral experience. This argument is important 
for motivating the explanatory challenge. Its conclusion is the irreducible 
plurality of reasons, which is a central plank in the explanatory challenge. 
So, for Ross, one resolves conflicts between prima facie duties not with 
reference to a third thing like a project or principle. The key move is the denial 
that prima facie duties are of a kind, or measurable in terms of a common 
kind like how much good each alternative produces. One resolves conflicts 
between prima facie duties by looking at those duties themselves. And this 
leads to an important point about the way Ross thinks of prima facie duties. 
A prima facie duty is not just something which initially appears to be one’s 
duty but which might turn out not to be one’s actual duty, as for instance when 
it initially appears to us to be our duty to keep a promise but then, on 
reflection, we ought actually to break it. It is that, but it is more. A prima facie 
duty, for Ross, is an actual duty unless there is some other prima facie duty 
with which it comes into conflict. As Ross puts it: 
‘I suggest ‘prima facie duty’…as a brief way of referring to the characteristic…which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind…, of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant.’19 
Ross is remarkably ambivalent on whether we arrive at the correct conclusion 
by rationally putting together the weights of the prima facie duties. A couple 
of remarks suggest that he would favour the view that when prima facie duties 
conflict, one of those becomes our actual duty by being a weightier duty: 
‘It may be said that besides the duty of fulfilling promises I have and recognize a duty of relieving distress, and when I think it right to do the latter at the cost of not doing the former, it is not because I think I shall produce more good thereby but because I think it is the duty which is in the circumstances more of a duty.’20 
And elsewhere: 
‘Every act therefore, viewed in some aspects, will be prima facie right, and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right acts can be 
                                                          19 P.19, ibid. 
20 P.18, ibid. 
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distinguished from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima facie wrong…for the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, as far as I can see, be laid down.’21 
The language of ‘more of a duty’, the ‘comparative stringency’ of duties, 
together with the classic metaphor of ‘balance’, express his attraction towards 
a weighing model. The other side of the ambivalence is his denial that such 
properties are epistemologically accessible in the same way as is the existence 
of the prima facie duties. This is plain in the last sentence of the above quote. 
His positive remarks on the epistemology of actual duty are vague: he 
suggests, quoting Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1109 b 23, 1126 b 4, that ‘the decision 
rests with perception.’ He also refers to a ‘sense’ of our particular duty, 
‘preceded and informed by the fullest reflection.’22 Finally, he suggests that 
when in a situation of conflicting duties, ‘what I have to do is to study the 
situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) 
than in the circumstances one of [the prima facie duties] is more incumbent 
than any other.’23 Perception, reflection or studying the world: what kinds of 
ways of gaining knowledge do these rule out (apart from, perhaps, 
testimony)?24 
The picture that emerges from this exposition is of a view which is motivated 
not by positive argument or a thorough study of examples but primarily by 
what it wants to reject: views which attempt ‘to state a single characteristic of 
right action’25, and utilitarianism as a dominant view of this kind. Moved by 
the thought that saving the prima facie appearances requires rejecting the 
                                                          21 P.41, ibid. 
22 P.42, ibid. 
23 P.19, ibid. 
24 His negative remarks on the epistemology of our actual duty are more determinate. He denies that our actual duty is self-evident when there is a conflict of prima facie duties: in conflict scenarios, ‘we are (I think) well aware that we are not certain whether we ought or ought not to do it; that whether we do it or not, we are taking a moral risk.’(P.30, ibid.) And he denies that knowledge of our actual duty could ever be deductive: ‘the only possible premises would be the general principles stating [acts’] prima facie rightness or wrongness…there is no principle by which we can draw the conclusion that it is on the whole right or on the whole wrong.’(P.31, ibid.) 
25 P.16, ibid. 
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general principles (in the light of which such appearances must inevitably be 
seen as illusory), Ross chooses to reject the general principles in order to save 
the appearances. The result is that when trying to account for the ground of 
actual, all-things-considered duty, there is not merely a missing bit of theory 
but active confusion over that in virtue of which actual duties hold. Some 
duties are more than others, but not so obviously so as to prohibit the 
possibility of the lesser duties’ appearing to be duties at all. So the facts of 
right action must be non-obvious: informed by thorough reflection and study 
of a kind that apparently cannot be spelled out on pain of being obvious in 
this objectionable way. 
This particular result follows from Ross’ concern to protect the genuineness 
of the prima facie duties. Translating Ross’ general view into a modern idiom 
makes clear the way in which this thought is mistaken. The prima facie duties 
are translated into ‘reasons’. Instead of an actions’ rightness being determined 
by the sum of the ways in which it is prima facie right or wrong, it is 
determined by all of the reasons for its being right or wrong taken together. 
For Ross, a duty could be our actual duty by being ‘more of a duty’ than all 
of the other pertinent duties; in the modern idiom, a reason for an act’s being 
right establishes its rightness just in case it is weightier than all the reasons 
against, or the set of reasons for that act’s being right is weightier. But what 
is clearly expressible in the modern idiom is the difference between a reason 
and what gives rise to that reason. A concern to keep one’s promises or the 
value of keeping them may give rise in any situation to a reason to keep that 
promise. A reason to promote the most benefit to others may clash with and 
be a better reason than the reason to keep one’s promises, but it does not 
follow from this that the concern to keep one’s promises is not appropriate or 
that we should not be so concerned. It did follow for Ross, in contrast, that if 
a duty to do X is clearly stronger than a duty to do Y, then with this knowledge 
the duty to do Y cannot coherently appear to be a duty in the first place. 
Because the modern idiom does not produce a similar result, there is no 
barrier within it to taking conflicts between reasons to be resolvable in a self-
evident or deductive way, which is what Ross denied. If reasons have weights, 
then one can simply add them together and derive the result. This kind of view 
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is more rationalist than Ross, in the relatively minimal sense that there is 
something we realize when we realize why an act is overall right, and the 
act’s rightness deductively follows. 
Despite the differences resulting from this reformulation, an examination of 
Ross is valuable not merely from a genealogical perspective but also because 
Ross did latch onto a genuine problem, a problem which the introduction of 
weights appears to solve. This problem, as I have argued, arises not just for 
Ross but for all parties, and so it is incumbent upon us to answer it. One of 
Ross’ concerns was to preserve a sense in which the conflicts between reasons 
is determinately resolvable. The other is to preserve the sense in which 
reasons, or prima facie duties, genuinely conflict. This conflict cannot be 
preserved under a theory which espouses a single characteristic of right 
action, such as utilitarianism. We can get this result even without thinking of 
reasons as prima facie establishing what we must do. 
Suppose we are in a choice situation and we are determined to do what 
promotes the most good to others. There are two choices, A and B: A would 
bring about x good, B would bring about y good, and x>y. Could we construe 
this as a scenario where the possibility of bringing about x good is a reason to 
choose A, the possibility of bringing about y good is a reason to choose B, 
and the general dictum to promote the most good adjudicates between these? 
Perhaps, but this characterization is not forced upon us. We could equally 
construe the choice as requiring a simple syllogism. The major premise: 
whichever choice would bring about the most good should be chosen. The 
minor premise: choice A brings about the most good. Conclusion: A should 
be chosen. Characterized in this way, there is no conflict between reasons. So 
this is the respect in which the endorsement of a single characteristic of right 
action fails to preserve a sense of conflict between reasons: it does not force 
upon us a characterization of justificatory questions as a conflict between 
reasons, since a characterization in terms of a syllogism serves equally well. 
The second ingredient in Ross’ problem was that conflicts between reasons 
are resolvable (at least for the most part) in that whenever there is an ethical 
question with reasons both for and against a central proposition, there is a 
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correct answer as to whether that proposition is true or false, and its truth or 
falsity is satisfactorily explained by the reasons. For example, if we are 
considering whether home schooling is a good thing, there are reasons both 
for and against this. In some circumstances it can raise standards, it allows 
more flexibility and the possibility of an education tailored to the needs of the 
individual, but also it can inhibit the development of a child’s social skills. 
Even here, where the issue is somewhat difficult to decide, there are one can 
lean one way or the other. I myself am inclined to the view that home 
schooling is not a good thing, though I acknowledge that there are genuine 
reasons in favour of it. 
With these two points in hand, we can formulate Ross’ problem as an 
explanatory challenge. Take the proposition: home schooling is a good thing. 
Call this P, and call the proposition that home schooling is a bad thing Q. As 
we’ve seen, there are reasons for P, and reasons against P and for Q. P and Q 
aren’t exhaustive: it could be that home schooling is ethically neutral. 
Suppose, with me, that Q is true: home schooling is a bad thing. We might 
think that this is because of the reasons in favour of Q. But there are reasons 
in favour of P as well. So this doesn’t explain why the fact that there are 
reasons in favour of Q should make Q true: there are reasons in favour of P, 
and yet those don’t make P true. So there is an explanatory challenge: why 
should the reasons in favour of Q establish Q, and yet the reasons in favour 
of P fail to establish P? 
To answer this challenge, some additional structural feature is needed. 
Weights are a good first pass at this. If the reasons in favour of Q are weightier 
than those in favour of P, then it makes sense that they should establish Q 
while the reason in favour of P fail to establish P. We could then extend this 
into an argument for the existence of weights, on the grounds of an inference 
to the best explanation. It is not yet an inference to the best explanation 
because we haven’t surveyed other good explanations. In this thesis I aim to 
introduce one; part of its purpose is to disrupt this implicit argument to 
weights from the consideration of the best explanation of the puzzling 
phenomenon noted above. 
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The first point of interest with the weighing model is not an objection so much 
as a challenge designed to clarify the commitments of the view. From this 
challenge it becomes clear that weight-based views gain apparent traction 
solely on an abstract front. We should evaluate them solely by their ability to 
solve Ross’ problem, if the argument below is correct. 
A crucial aspect of this view which was also arguably present for Ross is that 
whether a reason has a certain weight, or whether a duty is more of a duty 
than other duties, is itself a normative question. In the same way that someone 
is making a normative claim when they say that the fact of making a promise 
is a reason to keep it, they are making a normative claim when they say that 
this reason is weaker or stronger than the reason to promote the most good, 
in scenarios where they come into conflict. Schroeder is explicit about this26, 
but Broome is not27. In any case, whether or not writers acknowledge it, it is 
a straightforward consequence of the view. That a reason is weightier than 
other reasons involves some evaluation or appraisal, namely that that reason 
is one that we should take more seriously than other reasons, or should ‘place 
more weight on it’28. 
As to the first challenge: it also is rooted in the awkwardness of the 
dissociation between the weight of a reason and the reason’s existence. I 
suggest that weights gain traction as an attempt to solve Ross’ problem 
outlined above. But aside from this, weights are superfluous. They are not 
superfluous in the sense that they are an idle wheel. Rather, they are 
superfluous in the sense that they do not shed any light on justifications, even 
though they are not an idle wheel. There are a variety of ways in which a 
theory may shed light on justifications, each of which I will consider in turn: 
it may shed light on what justifications are, how we know them, when they 
are appropriate, or how we think about them. I will argue that weights do none 
of these things. 
                                                          26 See the formulation of the ‘Attractive Idea’ on p.130 of Slaves of the Passions 
27 In his writings on it in Rationality Through Reasoning chapter 4. 
28 Schroeder, p.130 of ibid. 
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If reasons have weights, then whenever it is clear what weights the relevant 
reasons have we can deduce what conclusion is justified. We can contrast this 
with a weight-less framework in which there is nothing but reasons and the 
conclusion. It is certainly not clear, whenever we know what the reasons are, 
we automatically know what the conclusion is. We might know that the 
potential educational benefit of home schooling is a reason in favour of the 
worth of doing it, and the potential social inhibition a reason against, without 
it being clear from that alone whether it is worth doing or not. This was one 
of Ross’s insights: in such a situation we have to consider it more until we 
come to a considered opinion. So one question to ask of the weights 
framework is whether it sheds any light on the process of coming to a 
considered opinion. 
The only way it can do that is if the following situation is possible. We know 
what the reasons are, but we are unsure what opinion we should adopt. Then 
we consider what weights the reasons have; if we can decide that, we can 
deduce what the proper conclusion is. What weights the reasons have is clear. 
So we deduce the proper conclusion. Hence, by adverting to weights, we have 
resolved our original uncertainty. Weights have done work. The key idea is 
that the question of what weights the reasons have must be in principle easier 
to settle than the outright question of what the proper conclusion is. Only if 
that is sometimes true will weights not be epistemically superfluous. 
A consideration of some examples suggests (but does not entail) that this is 
true. Whenever it is clear what the weights are, it is already clear what the 
conclusion is. So there is no scenario in which the question of what weights 
the reasons have is easier to settle than the simple question of what to 
conclude. 
Let’s start with the example I’ve been using. We’re wondering whether home 
schooling is a good thing: against we have the inhibition of social 
development, in favour of it we have the possibility of tailoring an education 
to individual needs. Suppose (modifying the example) it turned out that the 
inhibition to social development was very grave indeed, while the educational 
benefits were slight. By this point it is fairly clear that home schooling would 
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be a bad thing (were this true). But it does seem in that case to be more clear 
that the inhibition of social development is a weightier reason against home 
schooling than the educational benefits are in favour of it. Weights, then, 
would appear to add nothing in this example to the consideration of whether 
home schooling is good or bad. 
Here’s another example. Someone is burning in a malfunctioning factory and 
we are the only person around. It is open to us to charge in and try to save 
them. There is a 50/50 chance of saving them, with the alternative being that 
we fail and die as well. It’s not obvious what we should do (if you still think 
that we should try to save them, then lower the chance of success until that 
judgement disappears). But it is not obvious whether the prospect of saving 
them is a better reason to try to save them than the risk of failure and death is 
as a reason to refrain from trying. Neither the conclusion nor the weights are 
clear. Again, weights add nothing to the consideration of the issue. Weights 
are epistemically superfluous. 
Perhaps weights gain traction as a characterization of what it takes for a 
verdict to be a justified one. If home schooling is bad, then in a parsimonious 
account, it is bad because it inhibits social development, even though there 
are educational benefits. In the weights account, it is bad because it inhibits 
social development, and this reason is weightier than the reason in favour of 
it posed by the educational benefits. The addition of weights does not seem 
to add anything to the explanation. 
Finally, perhaps weights do work in an account of disagreement. I have in 
mind something like the following. When Chad and Clive disagree over 
whether home schooling is good or bad, but agree that the inhibition of social 
development is bad other things being equal, and agree that the possibility of 
tailoring an education to individual needs is good other things being equal, 
but still disagree over whether home schooling is good or bad, maybe we can 
say what it is they disagree about in terms of weights. Perhaps what it is they 
disagree about is the weightiness of the various reasons. Chad thinks the 
inhibition of social development is a weightier consideration than the 
possibility of tailoring an education; Clive thinks the opposite. It is because 
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they disagree about this that they disagree on whether home schooling is good 
or bad. Again, however, it is not clear what this adds to the same scenario 
redescribed without weights. Perhaps what Chad and Clive disagree about is 
simply the status of home schooling, even though they agree on what the 
reasons are. What is more perspicuous about saying that they disagree on how 
weighty the reasons are? 
If weights exist at all, then, we only have reason to think so on the basis of 
their ability to account, in the abstract, for why the reasons on one side of a 
case establish the conclusion they favour, whereas those on the opposite side 
fail. They can do this only if they form part of an adequate explanation for 
this phenomenon. Even if this were the case, however, they may suffer from 
an additional problem. Weights must themselves be explained: which weight 
relations hold between reasons, or how weighty individual reasons are. There 
is a danger that whatever would explain the weights would explain the 
original phenomenon the weights were supposed to explain. For example, 
suppose Chad arrives at the following view. He ought to eschew home 
schooling because the inhibition of social development is a weightier reason 
not to do it than is the educational benefit as a reason to do it. It is weightier 
because social competence is a key ingredient in future happiness, whereas 
educational disadvantage can be overcome. But we could then say that this 
difference in whether one can compensate for it itself explains why home 
schooling is to be avoided (on the basis of the inhibition of social 
development), even though the potential educational benefit is a reason to do 
it. What explains the weights can do the work the weights do: it’s not clear 
that anything is left out. Putting this in terms of Ross’ problem, we could then 
say that when a set of reasons R favours P while a set of reasons S favours Q 
which is incompatible with P, then what explains why P rather than Q (even 
though there are reasons for both) is itself a further reason. I find this 
argument from crowding out persuasive. In any case, I will now argue that 
weights cannot adequately explain the phenomenon in any case. 
I argued earlier that the claim that a reason has a certain weight must be 
normative. If these claims are normative, then they should themselves be 
subject to justification. It should be reasonable to demand justifications for 
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the claim that some reason is a weighty reason, and reasonable to expect that 
such demands can be answered. 
A problem arises here for the relational conception of weights. According to 
this conception, facts about the weightiness of reasons are fundamentally all 
and only relational facts, so we can talk coherently of one reason or set of 
reasons being weightier than another, but we cannot talk at this fundamental 
level of a reason being a weighty one simpliciter. So, that a reason is weightier 
than another one requires justification, and thereby requires justification in 
terms of reasons. 
The problem is best put in terms of an example. It is best to use those 
examples that the proponents of a particular view themselves use, so I would 
like to use Schroeder’s example of justifying the weightiness of certain 
reasons. Strangely, however, although Schroeder bases his account on a 
description of a weightier-than relation, the example he uses only has one 
reason for belief, and further reasons justifying whether that is a weighty 
reason for belief. There is no reason it is argued to be weightier-than. So the 
example does seem to be inconsistent with the thrust of Schroeder’s account. 
Specifically, he gives the example29 of seeing Tom emerge from the library, 
pull a book out from under his shirt and run off, which gives some reason to 
believe that he has stolen a book. But how weighty this reason is qualified by 
how likely it is that we have recognized Tom, for we know that his identical 
twin brother Tim is also in town. In this example, the reason to believe that 
Tom has stolen a book is judged for its weightiness without reference to any 
reason it is weightier than. So we’re going to have to modify the example in 
order to bring out the problem for a relational conception of weights. 
Suppose instead that Mary has told us that Tom is a very upright man who 
would never steal. This gives us some reason to believe that Tom has not 
stolen the book. We have to weigh this reason against that posed by what we 
saw: Tom, or a Tom lookalike, run off from the library with a book pulled out 
from under his shirt. We are wondering whether the latter reason is weightier 
than the former; if so, we should believe that Tom has stolen a book, and vice 
                                                          29 P.132, ibid. 
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versa. That the identical twin Tim is in town is a reason to place less weight 
on what we saw as a reason for believing that Tom stole the book. 
We might think, then, that the fact that Tim is in town is a reason to think that 
what we saw is a less weighty reason than what Mary told us. This has to be 
true, if the fact that Tim is in town is going to do work in justifying what 
weightier-than relation there is between these two reasons. But this doesn’t 
quite work as the structure of a justification. It falls foul of what it is to be a 
reason. To be a reason is, as it was for Ross, to be something that establishes 
the conclusion it favours unless there are contradictory reasons. So, for 
instance, that I promised is a reason to keep the promise, and ipso facto I 
should keep the promise unless there are other reasons not to. We can call this 
the presumptiveness condition. Schroeder also endorses this condition30, as 
does Scanlon31, and Horty32, effectively. 
But the above reason, that Tim is in town, falls foul of this condition. To meet 
this condition, it would have to be true that the fact that Tim is in town 
establishes that what we saw is a less weighty reason to believe that Tom stole 
the book than the reason against posed by what Mary told us, unless there are 
other reasons to believe that it is a weightier reason. But this is false in this 
case. Suppose there are no other reasons that bear on the matter. Just because 
Tim is in town, it doesn’t follow that what we saw is a less weighty reason 
than what Mary told us. Perhaps, even though Tim is in town, what we saw 
is a weightier reason to believe that Tom stole the book than the reason posed 
by what Mary told us. Hence, it does not make sense to think of the fact that 
Tim is in town as a reason to believe that what we saw is a less weighty reason 
than the reason posed by what Mary told us. If it were a reason, it would have 
                                                          30 See the definition of ‘ought’ on p.130, ibid. 
31 See the definition of outweighing on p.108 of Being Realistic About Reasons. 
32 Reasons as Defaults, (2012), ch. 1 and 2. A ‘default’ is a presumptive pattern of inference, so it follows that it establishes its conclusion absent other defaults. Horty also effectively endorses the relational conception of weights in making conflicting defaults resolvable by other defaults. Spelling this out, this would be a case where there is a presumptive pattern of inference A such that when confronted by presumptive patterns of inference B and C such that B and C both pertain presently, then the conclusion is that favoured by B and not C. 
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to establish its conclusion absent other reasons, but we have seen that it 
doesn’t. 
We might try to find a way to escape the presumptiveness condition. Perhaps 
you can have a reason to believe something without having any reasons not 
to believe it, and still you wouldn’t have to believe it. For instance, suppose 
you are on a bus and you fleetingly hear someone say that the Russians have 
just launched a nuclear strike against everywhere other than here. You suspect 
that you misheard, and it’s so implausible anyway. Although you don’t have 
any particular reason not to believe that the Russians have just launched a 
nuclear strike, you still wouldn’t have to believe that they did. So perhaps the 
condition is wrong. But this case isn’t quite right. You do have positive 
reasons to believe that the Russians haven’t just launched a nuclear strike: 
why would they? What would it get them? So this just isn’t an example of a 
case where you have some reason to believe something and no reasons against 
believing it. I have not encountered a more plausible case. 
Another response to my objection is to suppose that there will always be other 
reasons that bear on the matter of whether Mary’s testimony or our 
observation is weightier; in that case the scenario in which Tim’s being in 
town is the only reason which bears on the matter of which is weightier is 
excluded. For this to work, it would have to be the case that there are always 
other reasons which bear on the matter of whether Mary’s testimony or our 
visual experience is weightier. So we would have to be unable to conceive of 
a scenario in which there were no additional reasons other than that posed by 
Tim’s being in town. This could be true if those other reasons were bound up 
with the testimony or observation, so those first-order reasons could not be 
present without the reasons justifying their weight relation also being present. 
For example, perhaps Mary’s general reliability, in contrast to the general 
unreliability of fleeting observations, would serve as a reason justifying the 
proposition that Mary’s testimony was weightier than our observation. But 
that it is not a reason of the right kind; we can conceive of a case where that 
reason was not present. We could simply suppose that Mary was not generally 
reliable. It is not clear, then, that there are always other reasons which bear 
on the relative weightiness of Mary’s testimony and other observation, no 
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matter what the specifics of a scenario. And hence there are scenarios when 
Tim’s being in town is the only additional reason which bears on the matter 
of the weight relation.  
My objection purports to show the inadequacy of the relational-weights 
framework for making sense of the structure of the reasons in Schroeder’s 
example. We might think that all this shows is that there are certain bits of the 
framework we should drop (for instance, Ross’ presumptiveness condition on 
being a reason). But I think that my objection brings out a general structural 
problem which should at least constrain what counts as an adequate 
reworking of the theory. The challenge for the relational weight theorist is to 
show that the structure of justification which is to be present in the 
justification for overall, all-things-considered judgments will be replicated at 
the level of justifying which weight relations obtain between reasons. The 
theorist is not entitled to assume this. 
This objection doesn’t work against an absolute conception of weights, which 
is consistent with the possibility of the scenario I have used in my objection. 
According to that conception, a reason’s weight is fundamentally a non-
relational property of that reason. Although the weightier reasons defeat the 
less weighty reasons in a justification, what weight is is a non-relational 
property of reasons. Under this conception, what we justify when we justify 
the claim that a reason has a certain weight is that it has a non-relational 
property of having some level of weight w. So we can think of weight-
alteration scenarios as follows: one reason S has a certain weight w, the 
opposing reason T has a certain weight v, and further facts may be a reason R 
to think that S has a certain weight z, where z > w. By the condition and the 
fact that there are no other reasons, we conclude that S does indeed have a 
weight of z where z > w. It is entirely consistent with this conclusion that v > 
z, that T is weightier than S even with the extra information. And this is a 
satisfactory reading of the scenario I have used in my objection against the 
relational conception of weights. 
But this absolute conception of weights has its own awkwardnesses in 
describing the ways in which the weight of a reason is itself justified by other 
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reasons. As I have said, Broome does not explicitly acknowledge that a 
reason’s having a certain weight is itself normative, so he does not discuss 
what justifies it. I am extrapolating when I discuss an absolute conception of 
weights. 
If a reason R counts in favour of another reason S’s being of weight z instead 
of weight w, where z>w, what determines why it is z that it counts in favour 
of, rather than v or x, where both v and x are greater than w? Why one 
particular level of weight rather than another? In the limiting case, why should 
R not count in favour of S’s having an infinitely large weight, rather than in 
favour of its being of weight z? There does not seem to be any ready answer 
to these questions. So we might try to modify the view: reasons have certain 
weights. Other reasons may affect that weight by increasing it by a certain 
amount or decreasing it by a certain amount. R may increase S’s weight from 
w to z, another reason T may decrease S’s weight from z to x, and so on, until 
S has some remaining weight v. But again, as with the objection to the 
relational theorist: we are not entitled to assume that weights must conform 
to this structure. 
Secondly: given that R counts in favour of S’s having a certain weight z, what 
determines the weight R has in counting in favour of S’s having z, the weight 
which will determine what other reasons will successfully defeat the 
justification for S’s having z? If the weight of a reason is itself determined by 
reasons, a need for justification arises for the weight of those reasons which 
justify a reason’s having a certain weight. It is not clear what kinds of reasons 
would be involved in practice. Suppose the fact that social skills are more 
fundamental to human development is a reason in favour of the social loss of 
home schooling outweighing the potential educational benefit. What 
determines the weight of this reason (call it A)? Perhaps the importance of 
human development. In turn, what determines the weight of this as a reason 
in favour of A’s having a certain weight? There does not seem to be a ready 
answer to this question. In general, going back along the chain of justification, 
on this view, seems likely to lead to justificatory questions which lack an 
answer. There must be an answer on this view, on pain of the weight of a 
reason’s being unjustified or basic. Perhaps there are basic or unjustified 
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normative truths, but it is inappropriate to commit to them just because the 
abstract straitjacket into which one fits the reasons requires it. 
The absolute conception of weights is full of abstract pit-holes. It generates 
needs for justification by its abstract structure alone which have no clear 
solution. The result is an awkward view: one that does not generate a 
contradiction but which doesn’t fit the reasons as we find them. It is, in virtue 
of the burdens of justification it generates, a substantive view. This seems to 
cut against the way in which weight views tend to be presented, namely, as 
highly intuitive and innocent. 
The problems with both the relational and absolute conception of weights 
stem from the core feature of any weight-based view: the weight of a reason 
is an extra feature, even separate from, the fact that something counts as a 
reason in the first place. This separation introduces an awkward dissociation 
between the reasons behind a reason’s having a certain weight, and the basis 
for the reason in the first place. The separation is in the foreground in Ross: 
self-evident or deductive principles lie behind something’s being a prima 
facie duty in the first place, but nothing illuminating and general can be said 
about the interaction between these duties. 
In this section I have expressed scepticism about weights vis-à-vis their claim 
to shed light on justifications. But this is what we should expect in light of the 
character of Ross’ view. Ross’ view is not motivated by positive argument or 
a thorough study of examples but because it is a natural alternative to a kind 
of view Ross was hostile to. It is no wonder, then, that the view developed in 
this way generates no traction when applied to examples or when evaluated 
with respect to its ability to deliver positive, interesting predictions. This is 
the debunking explanation of why weighing models exist: they have been 
inherited from Ross, but not explicitly, and are therefore treated as the most 
natural thought, exempt from a need for positive argument. Broome 
introduces it like this33 as just ‘part of our vocabulary about reasons’. Scanlon 
introduces it like this34 as simply a datum to be accounted for. This is 
                                                          33 P.51, Rationality Through Reasoning (2013) 
34 P.3, Being Realistic About Reasons (2014) 
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misguided. Such views manage to be substantive in the abstract but 
superfluous in the concrete; and moreover they are attended with problems 
even in the abstract. They should be rejected. 
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Burdens of Justification 
 
In Chapter 1 I claimed that a justification for a normative proposition is best 
conceived as an explanation of the putative truth of that proposition. The 
reasons that count in favour of a normative proposition’s being true give the 
grounds on which the putative truth of that proposition depends. For a 
normative proposition to be justified just is for its truth to be explained. 
Spelling out what this means in more detail requires a thoroughly specified 
notion of explanation. Once we have this notion of explanation, we can give 
a construal of justification in terms of it. So in this chapter I will specify more 
thoroughly what explanation is, and then use it to give an account of the nature 
of justification. 
I adopt a particular conception of explanation according to which all 
explanation is contrastive, in a sense I’ll spell out soon. This is not a 
particularly new view; it has been around since the mid-1970’s35. But since 
its inception it has been concerned with issues in the philosophy of science: 
for example, clarifying the ‘miracles’ argument for realism (realism is the 
best explanation of the success of science, see Van Frassen 1980) or in 
overcoming some more traditional epistemological problems such as the 
problem of induction (Lipton 1991). The standard exposition of explanation 
and its contrastive nature is wrapped up in these concerns. So I aim in this 
first section to give an exposition of this conception of explanation that is free 
from these concerns and is more obviously applicable to the domain of the 
normative. I will play up those aspects of the conception that will be of 
importance later. 
A starting platitude in getting at explanation is that explanation aims at 
enabling understanding. If we want an explanation as to why p, a successful 
explanation enables us to understand why p. This platitude is good for a 
                                                          35 Van Frassen cites unpublished work by Bengt Hannson (1974): ‘Explanations-of-What?’ mimeographed and circulated, Stanford University. 
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couple of observations. First, it does not give us any reason to expect that 
explanatoriness is usefully formulated in terms of conditions on an explanans 
and conditions on the relation between an explanans and the explanandum, 
though it is consistent with this possibility. If explanation’s fundamental 
nature is to enable understanding, we should leave it open at this stage that a 
good explanation will have lots of separate parts, each tailored to a specific 
failure of understanding. (As it turns out, this is an aspect of a contrastive 
theory of explanation). Second, if explanation is there to enable 
understanding, then we should expect that what makes a good explanation in 
any particular circumstance depends heavily on what is required by the 
thinker to whom the explanation is addressed: that thinker whose lack of 
understanding is an issue. And so if there is such a thing as an explanation 
simpliciter of some phenomenon, in abstraction from the needs of a thinker, 
then we should expect that explanation simpliciter must be specified with a 
parameter that specifies the kind of general failure of understanding which 
the explanation simpliciter can remedy. 
The usual exposition of contrastive explanation, as I said above, proceeds 
against the background of a concern with the needs of a philosophy of science. 
One aspect of this is that explanation of p is usually taken to involve a 
specification of (some of) p’s causes. We can usefully generalize here. 
Explanations in general involve specifying that on which the explained 
phenomenon depends. In some circumstances this means specifying causes, 
but in the domain of the normative (as argued in chapter 1), it means 
specifying grounds. 
Taking causes rather than grounds to be central, a distinctive problem of 
explanation seems to emerge. Many natural phenomena have a long causal 
history: a history specifying what acted when and how that contributed to its 
current state. For example, a tattered piece of clothing might have a history 
of being worn on many occasions, each of which contributed in a small way 
to that piece of clothing’s becoming more tattered. And for many natural 
phenomena (perhaps even most or all) we can specify a causal chain which 
extends backward from that phenomenon through each of its causes. The 
cause of a bacterial infection may result from a lack of washing one’s hands 
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properly, which may be caused by the high price of soap, which may be 
caused by industrial strikes in the soap industry, and so on. 
Explanations are selective, however; they typically consist in giving only part 
of a phenomenon’s causal history. Why did the Colonel murder the Marquis? 
Because the Marquis had slighted him over croquet. This is an adequate 
explanation, even though the complete causal history of the murder extends 
far beyond this: to the motive, the means of the murder, the opportunity for 
committing it, and so on. So one problem of explanation that seems to emerge 
is what additional conditions there are on a cause for it to count as 
explanatory. 
This is certainly a genuine problem for the explanation of natural phenomena, 
but some of the assumptions in the set-up of the problem cannot be imported 
easily into the normative domain. One (correct) assumption is that the causes 
of natural phenomena will be many and varied far beyond what is needed for 
the purposes of explanation. It is not obvious, in contrast, that the grounds of 
normative truths are too many and varied to fit into an average explanation of 
that truth. So this consideration leaves open whether we are to think of an 
explanation of a normative truth as something more restricted than giving the 
grounds for it (I do eventually endorse this proposal, though, but for different 
reasons). 
A second, and more important, assumption is that we can identify the causes 
independently of engaging in explanation. If a phenomenon’s causes were 
simply those things given in an explanation of that phenomenon, then no 
sense could be made of the idea that explanation selects from a phenomenon’s 
causal history. But this is an idea the above problem invokes, so it thereby 
invokes the priority of causes over explanation. Van Frassen endorses this: 
‘Could it be that the explanation of a fact or event nevertheless resides solely in [its] causal net, and that any way of drawing attention to it explains? The answer is no; in the case of causal explanation, the explanation consists in drawing attention to certain (‘special’, ‘important’) features of the causal net.’36 (his italics) 
                                                          36 Scientific Image (1980), p.124-5, section 2.7 
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There are two distinctions here which we must not confuse. One is an 
epistemological distinction: causes are known through science, and 
explanations are known by getting at the relevant causes. We need not accept 
this distinction: science itself is partly driven by a quest for explanations. Van 
Frassen does not accept it37. In any case, it does not mark a contrast with the 
domain of the normative. There is no way in which we discover the grounds 
for normative truths apart from engaging in the practice of justification and 
reason-giving, which I have claimed are explicable in terms of the very notion 
of explanation. 
The second distinction is constitutive: the causes are, essentially, ‘whatever 
structure of relations science describes’38, and the explanations are whichever 
causes are relevant, where ‘relevance’ itself has no constitutive relation with 
the causes. This is a putative asymmetrical dependence: the nature of 
explanation depends on the causes, but the causes do not depend on the nature 
of explanation. So the causes of a natural phenomenon exist independently of 
any explanations of it. In the development of my theory, I will reject this 
assumption for the domain of the normative. The grounds of a normative truth 
do not exist independently of the justification for it. 
Because I reject this assumption, the problem of causal explanation posed 
above fails to get a grip for me in the domain of the normative. It is not as 
though there is a whole net of reasons for a normative truth which a 
justification then has to prune down, in order to get the relevant ones. Instead, 
the reasons for a normative truth must be discerned in light of the conception 
of how that normative truth is to be justified. I do not deny that sometimes 
there are more reasons for a normative truth than we are interested in, and so 
within a justification we will want to select. But I do deny that the reasons are 
constitutively downstream: that the reasons for a normative truth are 
independent of the justification for it. All this is so far just assertion, of course, 
but part of the point of this section is to point out potential limits to the 
analogy between explanation of natural phenomena and the explanation of 
                                                          37 ‘Explanatory power as a criterion of theory choice. That this is indeed a criterion I do not deny.’ P.23, ibid. 
38 P.124, ibid. 
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normative truth, even though I will make use of views of the former in order 
to illuminate the nature of the latter. 
Suppose we accept the above problem, however: we need a condition which 
selects a relevant cause from among all the causes of some event or some 
object’s causal history in order to yield an explanation of the event or state of 
affairs to be explained. This condition must arise from some structural feature 
of explanation. Let’s call this condition a ‘condition of relevance’, since it is 
meant to pick out the relevant cause from among all those involved in the 
causal history of some event or state of affairs.  
Sometimes the cause which figures in the explanation varies, depending on 
the explanation being asked for. If we ask why a steak knife cuts well, the 
explanation might vary depending on our interests. One explanation might be 
that the fineness of the edge makes penetration easier. Another might be that 
steak knives are designed to cut especially well because of the relative 
toughness of that which they are paradigmatically supposed to cut. These are 
different causes, not incompatible with each other, but still each may properly 
figure in an explanation, depending on one’s interests when one asks for an 
explanation. The amateur physicist may prefer the former answer, the 
potential customer another. Interests, then, sometimes determine the 
condition of relevance. 
Leaving aside the particular relevance of one’s interests in a request for 
explanation, such phenomena bring out an important general aspect of 
explanation. Explanations answer intrinsically to requests or demands for 
explanation. What explanation is appropriate depends on what kind of 
explanation is being asked for. So there is a separation between an 
explanatory question and an explanatory answer to such a question. We are 
to account for conditions of relevance by adverting to features of explanatory 
questions. And leaves in place a separate inquiry concerning what counts as 
a good answer to a specific why-question. 
We have seen how interests may bear on the condition of relevance at play in 
an explanation. But there is an additional dimension of explanation that is 
brought out by asking why something happened instead of or rather than a 
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different thing. Explanation of actions is an especially natural site for such 
concerns. Why did the Colonel murder the Marquis instead of chastising him? 
Why did the Colonel murder the Marquis rather than arrange for a duel? The 
answer to these questions will differ even though they concern the same 
event, namely the murder. An answer to the first may mention the Colonel’s 
extreme disposition to anger. An answer to the second may mention the 
Marquis’ excellent skills with a rapier. 
Both these questions can be seen as a particular specification of the core 
question: why did the Colonel murder the Marquis? And they bear on the 
answer to that general question. Two questions may concern the same event 
even if they are not derived from a common question using the ‘rather than’ 
operator. Why are you wearing tattered clothes? – I can’t afford to buy new 
ones. Why are your clothes so tattered? – I’ve had them for a long time. These 
are different questions, and different answers, though they both concern the 
same state of affairs, namely the state of the clothes the person is wearing. 
In the above examples, the difference in questions emerges in a difference in 
what the actual state of affairs is being contrasted with. The Colonel murdered 
the Marquis, and this is contrasted with a scenario in which he merely 
chastised him, or alternatively, another scenario in which he arranged a duel. 
Someone is wearing tattered clothes, and this is contrasted with the scenario 
in which they are not wearing tattered clothes, and alternatively, another 
scenario in which those clothes they are wearing aren’t tattered. 
In each of these examples, then, a contrast scenario is introduced. It is 
contrasted with what is actually the case. Following van Frassen39, we call the 
actual state of affairs the ‘topic’ of a request for explanation. In the above 
examples an adequate explanation must explain why the topic is true rather 
than the contrast. Why did the Colonel murder the Marquis rather than 
chastise him? The Colonel’s extreme anger explains why. But the anger 
wouldn’t explain why the Colonel murdered the Marquis rather than 
arranging a duel; both would be adequate expressions of anger. So we must 
introduce another explanatory factor, the unlikeliness of a successful duel. 
                                                          39 P.141, ibid. 
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This explains why the Colonel would choose to murder the Marquis rather 
than fight him honourably. It is tempting to try to analyse away the contrast 
and replace it with a non-contrastive explanandum: perhaps a conjunctive 
one, such as ‘Why did the Colonel murder the Marquis and not arrange for a 
duel?’ But this is misguided; I defer to Lipton’s excellent arguments here40. 
It is important that the contrast is not always incompatible with the topic. 
Although one can ask why the Colonel murdered the Marquis rather than 
chastising him, it is not ruled out by the question that he could have done 
both. Sometimes it is incompatible, as when one asks why someone’s clothes 
are tattered instead of whole: they couldn’t have been both. Moreover, it is 
important that the contrast does not always concern the same event as the 
topic. One can ask why the Colonel murdered the Marquis but he did not 
murder the Earl, even though the Earl also slighted him over croquet, just as 
the Marquis did. This question does not ask of one event why it did not turn 
out differently, but why a different event did not turn out the same, as we 
might have expected it to. 
All this raises the question of what conditions there are on something to count 
as a sensical contrast with a topic. It doesn’t have to be incompatible, and it 
doesn’t even have to concern the same event or state of affairs. But there are 
clearly limits. It doesn’t make sense to ask why the Colonel murdered the 
Marquis but he did not wash up the dishes. But is there an illuminating 
abstract condition on something to count as a contrast? The closest that can 
perhaps be said is that something counts as a contrast relative to a given topic 
if both involve the same kind of causes, and there is a question over how those 
causes operate. For example, the Colonel murdering the Marquis involves the 
same kind of cause as chastising him would: both would be a response to the 
slight over croquet. The question is why the slight over croquet resulted in the 
topic rather than the contrast. On the other hand, if we ask why the Colonel 
murdered the Marquis but did not murder the Earl, even though both slighted 
the Colonel over croquet, again we have the same cause, namely the croquet 
insult. There is a question over what effect that insult had: why it had one 
                                                          40 See the section entitled ‘Failed reductions and False differences’, in chapter 3 of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (2004) 
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effect in the topic but not the same effect in the contrast. No common cause 
is present in the dishwashing contrast: murdering the Marquis, and washing 
up the dishes, would not share a common cause. Showing that there is no 
sensical contrast is a way of showing that a request for explanation which 
uses a particular contrast is not a legitimate explanation request. 
Some, perhaps all, of the relevance of one’s interests to explanation can be 
captured in the selection of a suitable contrast or class of contrasts. The 
amateur physicist wants to know why steak knives cut well while some other 
objects which physically differ don’t. The potential customer wants to know 
why steak knives cut especially well while various other consumer goods 
don’t. Instead of speaking of explanation as relative to interests, then, we 
should say that an explanation of a topic is an explanation relative to a 
particular class of contrasts (and the selection of contrast class may depend 
on one’s interests). When we vary the contrast class, the explanation varies. 
Because of this, giving an explanation of a topic never requires the selection 
of a particular contrast class instead of others. The explanation itself pertains 
only relative to a given contrast selection; and as long as the contrast class 
one selects is genuine, there are no constraints on which contrast class one 
must choose. 
This raises the question of whether or how it is possible to explain a topic tout 
court, absent any particular contrast class. We cannot take this for granted on 
the basis that ordinary-language requests for explanation infrequently specify 
an explicit contrast class, for a contrast class may frequently be implicit. For 
example, if someone asks why the Colonel murdered the Marquis, period, 
then we might suspect that they are asking why the Colonel murdered the 
Marquis as opposed to not wanting to kill him at all, a question answered by 
a mention of the insult over croquet. That would certainly be a reasonable 
interpretation of the question. 
Lipton has another suggestion: he assimilates explaining a topic tout court to 
explaining why it should happen instead of its being the case that it does not 
happen. He says: 
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‘The way to construe [our preferred conception of explanation] as it applies to the limiting case of the contrast, P rather than not-P, is that we must find a difference for events logically or causally incompatible with P, not for a single event, ‘not-P’…To explain why P rather than not-P we do not, however, need to explain every incompatible contrast. We do not, for example, need to explain why Jones contracted paresis rather than being long dead or never born. The most we can require is that we exclude all incompatible foils with histories similar to the histories of the fact.’41 
The suggestion is in effect that we quantify over contrasts and explain why p 
as opposed to many incompatible contrasts i.e. many ways in which not-p 
might have occurred. The suggestion is correct in that explaining all of these 
incompatible contrasts will be relevant to giving a full explanation of p (I 
assume that explaining p tout court is the same as explaining why p as 
opposed to not-p). Explaining why the Colonel murdered the Marquis 
involves explaining why he did so rather than chastise him or walk away. Is 
Lipton right to suggest that there are limitations on ways of being not-P that 
are required in order to explain why P rather than not-P? Although it seems 
plausible that explaining why Jones contracted paresis shouldn’t require 
explaining why he isn’t long dead, one wonders why. The reason, I think, is 
that this way of being not-P is not a contrast to P in the first place, even though 
it is a way of being not-P. It wouldn’t make sense in the first place to ask why 
Jones contracted paresis rather than being long dead. Hence we should think 
of Lipton’s suggestion of universally quantifying over contrasts: as using the 
criterion for something’s being a contrast in order to determine what ways of 
being not-P require explanation when trying to explain why P rather than not-
P. So, in this revised proposal, giving an explanation as to why P tout court 
is explaining why P rather than not-P, which in turn is explaining why P as 
opposed to every way in which not-P might have been the case. 
Another question we might ask, though, is why explaining p rather than not-
p should be limited to incompatible contrasts. Why should explaining why 
the Colonel murdered the Marquis instead of leaving him alone not also 
involve explaining why the Colonel murdered the Marquis but not the Earl? 
Explaining this latter contrast may shed light on the Colonel’s motives for 
                                                          41 p.49-50, ibid. 
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murdering the Marquis, and as such are relevant to the question of why he 
murdered the Marquis, tout court, and are part of a full explanation of why he 
murdered the Marquis. So for example, if it turned out that the reason the 
Colonel murdered the Marquis but not the Earl was because he was friends 
with the Earl and he thought that he should forgive the Earl out of friendship, 
then part of the explanation for why he murdered the Marquis is that the 
Colonel did not have a reason of friendship to forgive the Marquis’ insult. 
Finally, a couple of remarks on what makes a legitimate answer to a 
(legitimate) request for explanation. The key is that an answer discriminates 
between the topic and the contrast: it provides a difference between the two 
that explains why they turned out differently, with the implication that had 
the difference not been in place, the two would have turned out the same (if 
there are no additional relevant differences either). For example, if the reason 
the Colonel murdered the Marquis but not the Earl, even though both insulted 
him, was that he had great respect for the Earl but not for the Marquis, then 
had the Colonel had great respect for the Marquis as well then he would not 
have murdered him (if there are no other relevant differences); conversely, if 
the Colonel had had no respect for the Earl, he would have murdered him (if 
there are no other relevant differences). 
A tricky issue for theories of explanation that take their cue from the 
philosophy of science is how to construe explanations that deal with non-
determining causes i.e. causes that make an outcome probable rather than 
certain. For example, if being an atom with a certain unstable internal 
configuration makes it 50% likely that it emits a particle within a minute, and 
it does, how good an explanation of this emission is it that the atom had that 
unstable configuration? This issue does not arise for norms, however, given 
the assumption that there are no normative truths whose justification make 
them merely probable. There may be normative truths which are themselves 
probabilistic truths, as when it is probable that one course of action in 
particular is the best. But this is not a truth whose justification makes it merely 
probable: the justification may be perfectly adequate. This is another way, 
then, in which a theory of explanation for normative truth differs from that 
for scientific truth. 
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Now that I have laid out a certain conception of explanation, I will illustrate 
how this conception can be applied to the explanation of normative truth. First 
I will discuss justification for normative truth: what justification is if it is an 
explanation, and if explanation works contrastively. Then, in the next chapter, 
I will turn to the topic of reasons, and how reasons figure in justifications: I 
conceive of this topic as very much downstream from the nature of 
justifications. 
Justifications are explanations, and explanations are contrastive: in every 
explanation there is a parameter, either implicit or explicit, which is the set of 
contrast cases. So we should expect the same to be true of justifications. 
Within every justification, there is a parameter which is the contrast class. 
Every scenario in the contrast class contrasts with the topic being justified, 
and each provokes a burden of justification, in the same way that for 
explanation a topic-contrast pair provokes a burden of explanation. Here are 
some examples of normative topics and possible contrasts. 
 Choosing to undergo plastic surgery is in general a dodgy thing to do, 
if not actually wrong. While there is nothing wrong with 
reconstructive surgery in particular, there is something amiss with 
undergoing plastic surgery in order to try to make oneself more 
attractive. However, there is nothing wrong with putting on makeup. 
It is perfectly legitimate to put on makeup to try to make oneself more 
attractive, within limits—people should avoid damaging their skin, or 
wearing makeup compulsively or out of insecurity. Both plastic 
surgery and makeup involve changing one’s appearance to make 
oneself more attractive. The question is unavoidable: Why should it 
be that choosing to undergo non-reconstructive plastic surgery is 
untoward, while wearing makeup is in general OK? 
 The final round of the 2002 French presidential election featured two 
candidates: Jacques Chirac, and Jean-Marie Le Pen. It was obligatory 
to vote for Chirac in this election. But it wasn’t obligatory, or at least 
not as obligatory, to vote for Chirac in any of the previous elections. 
There are two questions. Why was it obligatory to vote for Chirac over 
Le Pen? (The answer should be known to anyone with a minimal 
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knowledge of the two candidates.)  Second: Why the special urgency 
in the 2002 presidential election?  
 Harry faces a choice over what kind of career to pursue. One option 
that is a real possibility for him is to become a well-paid IT consultant: 
he’s been offered a job of this nature. A second possibility for him is 
to become an entrepreneur and pursue his own ideas, of which Harry 
has many, but with all the usual risks: low income, failure. So the 
question emerges for Harry: how shall he live? Suppose he should 
become an entrepreneur. Why should he become an entrepreneur 
instead of a consultant? 
These examples differ in form.  
The first contains a topic to be justified/explained, namely the dodginess of 
plastic surgery, and the contrast is the non-dodginess of makeup. It is striking 
that the one should be dodgy and the other not, given their seeming essential 
similarity. For anyone who believes that plastic surgery is dodgy but that 
makeup is not, the question arises as to why. This question also arises for 
anyone who is tempted to believe that plastic surgery is dodgy but who is not 
tempted to believe that wearing makeup is. Because of these features, it is a 
question about the justification of the proposition that plastic surgery is 
dodgy. If no answer can ultimately be given to this question, then it cannot be 
true that plastic surgery is dodgy yet makeup not. If it were true, it would have 
an answer. So the burden of justification does not merely arise for someone 
who already believes the two claims. It also arises for anyone considering 
these two claims: unless the question is settled for them, they cannot consider 
the proposition that plastic surgery is dodgy justified. 
In this example, the contrast is compatible with the topic in the sense given 
above that it is not an alternative to the scenario envisaged in the topic. It 
could be true both that plastic surgery is dodgy and makeup is. It could also 
be true both that plastic surgery is not dodgy and wearing makeup isn’t either. 
Finally, it could be true that the one was dodgy and the other not, and vice 
versa. All these are possible positions in logical space. In addition, there is a 
clear common cause or common ground that might potentially explain why 
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there is a pressing contrast here. Both procedures involve changing one’s 
appearance in order to make oneself more attractive. Given this particular 
similarity, it is surprising that the two procedures should ethically differ. In 
this way the example exhibits some of the hallmarks of a contrastive burden 
of explanation explored above. 
In the second example, there are two separate contrastive burdens of 
explanation/justification. First, there is a burden of justification concerning 
why it was obligatory to vote for Chirac over Le Pen. Unlike the previous 
example, this contrast is incompatible with the topic, in that the scenario it 
envisages forms an alternative to that envisaged in the topic. The choice at 
the time was to vote either for Chirac or for Le Pen, and voting for both was 
impossible. In this example there is no obvious common ground, no relevant 
similarity which might explain why the contrast is there. For this example, 
the explanation of why there is a contrast there is bound up with the 
importance of the options. There was much at stake in that election, and 
therefore it was of importance who to vote for. Hence, if it was obligatory to 
vote for Chirac over Le Pen, a pressing question arises over why the one rather 
than the other. 
The second burden of justification is quite different, concerning why it was 
obligatory to vote for Chirac in the second round of the French 2002 election, 
but not obligatory, or at least not quite as obligatory, to do so in any of the 
elections prior to that (or any of the ones after) in which he stood. This 
contrast is compatible with the topic: it could be true that it was obligatory to 
vote for Chirac in all these elections, or in none of them, or in any particular 
set of them. Furthermore, there is a common ground: the fact that Chirac was 
on the ballot in each of them. 
From these examples of compatible contrasts and their common grounds I 
tentatively conclude that the existence of the common ground (and hence the 
existence of the contrast) is related to the reasons in favour of the topic, and 
depends on them. Part of what made it obligatory to vote for Chirac over Le 
Pen in that 2002 election was certain features of Chirac that Le Pen lacked. 
Hence, the fact that it was Chirac standing is part of the reason for voting for 
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him over Le Pen in that election. The fact that it was Chirac standing was the 
common ground we adduced to explain the existence of the contrast class 
composed of other elections where Chirac stood. A question emerged over 
why it was obligatory to vote for Chirac in that 2002 election but not in the 
others. Likewise, with the example of plastic surgery, that it is done solely to 
make oneself more (conventionally) attractive is arguably part of the reason 
for its dodginess. Perhaps it represents an uncomfortable subversion of a 
hallowed personal space before the external authority of social convention. If 
this is true, then the fact that it is done in order to make oneself more 
conventionally attractive should serve as a common ground that creates a 
contrast wherever it pertains in a different circumstance. It pertains in the case 
of makeup, hence it creates the contrast of makeup to the topic of non-
reconstructive plastic surgery. It creates the question concerning why makeup 
should be legitimate and non-reconstructive plastic surgery not. 
There is only one contrast in the third example, and it is an incompatible 
contrast: Harry cannot be both a consultant and an entrepreneur. Much like 
the first contrast in the second example, what makes it a contrast is the 
importance of the choice: it will bear heavily on his future choices and, if he 
makes the wrong choice, it will bear on his quality of life. Hence, if Harry is 
tempted to choose one over the other, there is a pressing question for him as 
to why he should choose the one over the other, if he should do this at all. If 
an answer cannot be given, then the proposition that he should the one over 
the other is unjustified. 
The purpose of these examples has been to illustrate how contrastive burdens 
of explanation apply with full force to justification, to make it clear how there 
can be contrastive burdens of justification as well. Another purpose of these 
examples is to illustrate the generality of the thesis. A similar kind of demand 
for justification applies in the case with an overtly moral claim about who it 
was obligatory to vote for; one concerns principally a question of prudential 
evaluation; and finally, the first example concerning plastic surgery is in the 
realm of the ethical without being overtly moral.  
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What is of interest in these examples is the kind and origin of the questions 
that arise; I will not look at specific answers to these questions, though I 
strongly expect that there are adequate answers. If there are answers, then 
they are answers that provide explanations. If we understand why plastic 
surgery should be dodgy but makeup not, then we know part of the answer as 
to why plastic surgery should be dodgy, and so we know part of the 
justification as to why plastic surgery should be dodgy. Suppose the answer 
is that plastic surgery makes one to some extent unrecognizable, whereas 
makeup generally doesn’t do this. Then we know at least part of why plastic 
surgery is dodgy—because it makes one unrecognizable—and we know at 
least part of the justification for its being dodgy—because it makes one 
unrecognizable. So the answers to such question are explanations and thereby 
justifications, and the questions that elicit them are therefore themselves 
requests for justification and thereby requests for explanation. 
I have said that the presence of a common ground is a way a contrast can 
come to be (in the examples so far, one which is compatible with the topic). 
What is common must be a ground in the sense that it must be closely related 
to a reason in favour of the topic. For example, the fact that Chirac was 
standing is closely related to the justification for voting for him over Le Pen 
in the 2002 second-round French presidential election, because the fact that 
Chirac was standing is presupposed by the justification for voting for him 
over Le Pen. Hence, where this pertains elsewhere, the potential for a contrast 
is created. If it was obligatory to vote for Chirac in the second round of the 
2002 election but not in other elections where he stood, the fact that it was 
Chirac standing is common throughout and so a serious question arises as to 
why it was obligatory to vote for him in that election but not in those other 
elections. 
Where a common ground underlies a burden of justification, one can show 
the burden of justification to be illegitimate by showing that there is no 
common ground; if there is a burden of justification, it has to be given some 
other foundation. The existence of a specific common ground may be a 
presupposition someone makes if they think that a specific scenario 
constitutes a contrast to the topic, one which poses a serious question as to 
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how the topic can be justified. So by showing the presupposition to be false, 
one can show the question to be illegitimate. 
Here is an example. Suppose a modern-day Christian has the following pair 
of attitudes. They condemn adultery, but they do not condemn divorce. For 
us the question arises over why they should do one but not the other. After 
all, the biblical prohibition against divorce is at least as strong as that against 
adultery. However, this person, when pressed, denies that there is a serious 
biblical prohibition against divorce. This refutes the question: it no longer 
makes sense to ask why they should condemn adultery but not divorce, with 
this knowledge that they deny the existence of a biblical prohibition against 
the latter. 
Common grounds are a source of compatible contrasts, (but not, I will argue 
later, a necessary condition on their existence). In the case of incompatible 
contrasts, I claimed that the importance of one’s options is a common source 
in cases of choosing what to do. If Harry ought to choose to become an 
entrepreneur over a consultant, then this requires a justification, because of 
the potentially huge ramifications of the choice; and whatever he is uniquely 
justified in doing (if anything), that is something Harry in some sense ought 
to do. Even if the two are on a par or are in some sense incommensurable with 
each other, then this in turn still requires a justification, just because of the 
importance of the choice. 
In contrast, a choice scenario in which there were no potentially important 
ramifications to the choice would not demand justification in these ways. Say, 
for example, you have decided to snack on a piece of fruit and you are faced 
with a choice between some strawberries and some raspberries. Certainly, if 
it’s true that you ought to choose the strawberries over the raspberries, then 
the question arises as to why this should be so. So even in this circumstance 
of unimportant choice, contrastive burdens of explanation can arise. But if it’s 
not true that you ought to choose one over the other, as is plausible in the case 
of strawberries and raspberries, then no topic/contrast pair is generated, and 
no demand for justification arises. This contrasts with the case of important 
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choice: there, if the two options are on a par, the demand for justification still 
holds. 
Anscombe was right when she wrote: 
‘when I do action A for reasons R, it is not necessary or even usual for me to have any special reason for doing-action-A-rather-than-action-B, which may also be possible.’42 
She is right in the sense that a requirement to have an adequate justification 
for doing one thing rather than another does not usually pertain to cases of 
choosing to do one thing over another. I need have no special reason for 
choosing outfit 1 over outfit 2 when I choose to wear outfit 1 today. But this 
feature marks out a contrast between the justification for actions and the 
justification for normative propositions. Choosing to do one thing over 
another does not automatically require a justification, but if you ought to do 
one thing over another, this does automatically require a justification. 
Because of the closeness of ‘ought to do X’ propositions to actions, it is 
tempting to assimilate the two vis-à-vis when justification is required. I have 
argued that this is mistaken. ‘Ought to do X’ propositions are one kind of 
normative proposition that involves incompatible contrasts and so fall under 
that more general account. Another kind of normative proposition that 
involves an incompatible contrast concerns what is optimal.  For example, 
one might wonder whether things go best when the population is pious, or 
whether things go best when the population is not at all pious. Perhaps things 
go best when there are varying levels of piety in the population, so there 
would be diversity in ways of living. This is not a question over what to do, 
though it might be important to matters of public policy. Still, it involves 
incompatible alternatives that are interesting i.e. which are not simply the 
contradictories of whatever proposition we are considering. What burdens of 
justification are there here, and what generates them? 
At this point we should revise the idea that the importance of the issue is what 
generates the contrastive burden of justification where incompatible contrasts 
pertain. We can extend the idea that a common ground is what generates the 
                                                          42 Who is Wronged?, Anscombe (1967), pp.16-17 
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burden, but connect this to the importance of the issue. Suppose that things 
are optimal when the population has varying levels of piety. This is an issue 
of importance. Part of the explanation of why things are optimal when the 
population is variable in piety is that the issue of the general piety is an 
important one: it affects the ways of life that are open to the average citizen, 
and affects more besides. If it didn’t matter whether the population was pious 
or not, then any particular configuration of the general piety wouldn’t be 
better than any other; and so there wouldn’t be a fact of the matter as to 
whether things go best when the population is pious or not. 
So, the importance of an issue can be part of the explanation of why a 
particular normative verdict on that issue is appropriate. If the issue weren’t 
important, then no strong normative verdict would be appropriate. Because it 
is part of the explanation, it is apt to serve as a common ground in the sense 
explored above. It can be shared between different scenarios and so a 
contrastive burden of justification is generated: one of those scenarios will be 
a contrast and another the topic. For example, suppose again that things are 
optimal when the population has varying levels of piety. The question arises: 
why is it better that the population is variably pious than that it is totally pious; 
and why is better that a population is variably pious than that it is not at all 
pious? Here the contrasts (high piety and no piety) are incompatible with the 
topic of varying piety. So here the presence of a common ground can make 
an incompatible alternative a contrast to the topic, generating a burden of 
justification. 
This is the general account that we should apply to the ‘ought to do X’ 
propositions as well. If Harry ought to become an entrepreneur, then part of 
the explanation for this is that it is an issue of importance, affecting what 
choices he will be able to make in the future. Becoming a well-paid consultant 
is an issue of importance as well; again it will greatly affect the kind of life 
Harry will be able to lead. So the question arises: why ought Harry to become 
an entrepreneur instead of its being the case that he ought to become a 
consultant? 
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We have, then, an entirely general account of when contrastive burdens of 
justification arise: they arise where there is a common ground between 
contrast and topic, a common ground which would form part of the 
justification/explanation for each. In cases of incompatible contrasts, this 
common ground is the importance of the issue. In cases of compatible 
contrasts, the common ground varies between specific cases. If all burdens of 
justification are contrastive, then we have a serious constraint on when a need 
for justification arises. I have not yet argued that all burdens of justification 
are actually contrastive in nature, even when they do not explicitly mention a 
contrast. First, I will argue that if this is true, a very interesting consequence 
follows with respect to the possibility of basic normative truths, truths which 
are not explained by any other normative truths. 
Suppose that the existence of a common ground is necessary and sufficient 
for the generation of a need for justification in the ways I have outlined: we 
can put aside the issue I raise later about burdens of justification theorised 
into existence. It follows that where a common ground is absent, no need for 
justification arises. Further, it follows that if no common ground exists for a 
particular normative topic with respect to any possible contrast, then there are 
no contrasts for that topic. That topic would then lack a need for justification. 
Furthermore, there would be no respect in which a justification could be 
provided: for that a justification would have to address contrastive burdens of 
justification which, ex hypothesi, do not arise. 
Let’s call this property of not needing a justification the terminal property. A 
normative proposition with the terminal property lacks a need for justification 
and lacks the possibility of being justified. This is not to say that that 
proposition must on that account be true. Rather, it is to say that if it is true, 
still it does not need justification, nor could one be provided. If it should be 
given up, this requires a different ground than not being justified. 
In Chapter 1 I assumed an understanding of justification according to which 
if a justification could not ultimately be provided for a proposition that needs 
one, then we shouldn’t take that proposition to be true. This does not imply 
that any proposition which ultimately lacks a justification should be given up, 
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because some propositions may not need justification. A non-normative 
example of such a proposition is perhaps the law of non-contradiction: a 
proposition and its contradictory cannot be simultaneously true. If it is true, 
then it does not seem as though it is true in virtue of some other truth, or that 
it is to be explained by some other truths. Still, it does not seem to hold 
brutely: it is not a cost to our view of the world that we cannot give a deeper 
explanation of the law of non-contradiction. In the same way, if some 
normative propositions are terminal, it may not be a cost to our normative 
worldview that we cannot give a deeper explanation or justification for them. 
What kind of normative proposition is a candidate for being terminal? I 
suggest an Aristotelian-in-spirit function principle as an illustrative example. 
I am not concerned with the function principle qua argument, so that we can 
deduce rich ethical conclusions by filling information about what the 
functions of humans are. Furthermore, I am taking the function principle out 
of the strong naturalism in which it is embedded, and treating it as a self-
standing principle. Hence the principle is Aristotelian only in spirit. Let’s call 
this principle G: 
G): It is good when humans act so as to develop their distinctively 
human capacities 
To show that G is terminal, we have to show that there are no potential 
contrasts that could be drawn. 
Are there any compatible contrasts? Let’s try a few. It is not good (it need not 
be bad, but still is not a good thing) when humans act so as to develop 
distinctively piggish capacities—let’s assume this. (Let’s call this principle 
H). So perhaps a question arises concerning why it should be good when 
humans develop distinctively human capacities but not good for them to 
develop distinctively piggish capacities. This is compatible, since it is a 
possible position in logical space that both are true: it is good when humans 
develop distinctively human capacities and not good for them to develop 
distinctively piggish capacities. 
The common ground would be distinctive capacities: since its being 
distinctive capacities that are at stake is important to G, and they are also at 
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stake in H, a question arises over why the two should differ. But the common 
ground is not genuine. The presence of distinctive capacities does not explain 
G in any way or extent, only the distinctively human capacities. Hence there 
is no common ground between G and H on this score, and there is no burden 
of justification as to how G and H can both be true. 
What about: it is good for humans to develop distinctively human capacities, 
but not good for pigs to develop distinctively human capacities. Why? But in 
this example, it is not a real possibility that pigs could develop distinctively 
human capacities. Hence, it is questionable whether there is a genuine burden 
of justification here. 
In the roughly Aristotelian framework which I am considering, it is good 
when any x behaves so as to develop or fulfil its distinctive capacities, or 
those capacities distinctive of x’s kind, not just when humans do so. So no 
contrast can be generated on that score. 
When a normative truth is taken as basic, it is inevitable within my system 
that there will be no compatible contrasts, even if the truth ultimately isn’t 
basic, contra how it is taken. For a compatible contrast requires a common 
ground, a common ground is part of the justification for those truths, a truth 
which is taken to be basic is taken not to have a justification, and so any 
normative truth taken to be basic must be taken not to have anything which 
could serve as a common ground and generate a contrast. 
What about incompatible contrasts? The simplest incompatible contrast is the 
negation of G: it is not good when people act as to develop their distinctively 
human capacities. Does this create a burden of justification? Only if there is 
a common ground resulting from the importance of the issue. 
Cases of incompatible contrasts created by the issue’s being important were 
like the following. It is important if it is optimal that the population is pious, 
since it has a significant effect on proper policy decisions. Similarly, it is 
important if it is optimal that the population is not at all pious: that likewise 
has a significant effect on proper policy decisions. 
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This schema, interestingly, cannot apply to G. It is important if G is true, since 
that affects our evaluation of all kinds of things. But it is not important if G is 
false, since if we start out from a position of neutrality on G, the conclusion 
that G is false does not affect our evaluations. If we were neutral on G, we 
were not guided by G in making our evaluations, and so deciding against G 
does not change any of the evaluations we made. The only sense in which it 
is important that G is false is the derivative and uninteresting sense that it is 
important if we were mistaken in thinking G to be true. So the importance of 
an issue cannot be the common ground which generates an incompatible 
contrast. Hence, there is no burden of justification on why it should be true 
that it is good when humans develop their distinctive capacities, as opposed 
to false. 
Here is another incompatible contrast: it is bad when humans develop 
distinctively human capacities. We might wonder: why should it be a good 
thing when humans develop distinctively human capacities as opposed to a 
bad thing? Both of these would be important: if it is a bad thing that humans 
develop distinctively human capacities, then this should affect everything 
from policy decisions to personal life decisions. So it seems that an 
incompatible contrast is generated here.  
But the importance of the issue does not genuinely generate a contrast here. 
For it to do so, it would have to be part of the explanation of why it was good 
that humans develop their distinctively human capacities. But that that issue 
is important is not part of the explanation as to why human development of 
human capacities is good. Rather, it’s being good explains why it is important. 
In contrast, in the case of career choice, that career choice is an important 
issue is part of why one ought to make a particular choice over another: it’s 
not the case that the fact that one ought to choose a particular career over 
another is part of the explanation as to why career choice is important. 
(Incidentally, this suggests that in general ‘ought to do X’ proposition are 
more in need of justification than propositions concerning what is good or 
bad.) So, G appears to be genuinely terminal. 
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This discussion illustrates how a normative proposition can fail to incur a 
contrastive burden of justification. On the assumption that all burdens of 
justification are contrastive in nature (I will argue for this soon), that 
normative proposition is terminal: it incurs no burdens of justification 
simpliciter. Since justifications essentially respond to burdens of justification, 
it follows that for a terminal normative proposition there is simply no 
justification. So it is basic. 
This is not the only way in which a particular normative truth might be 
thought to be basic. Instead, some particular normative truth might be posited 
by theory to be basic, even though it clearly faces a burden of justification. 
For example, suppose we believed that it is basic that it is impermissible to 
kill. More likely we would simply not be articulate enough to be able to give 
a better justification. Still, it is possible that it is ‘just’ impermissible to kill—
without there being a deeper justification for this, a justification which may 
fail to apply in some cases. In this theory, then, it is basic that it is 
impermissible to kill, even though, there is a clear burden of justification as 
to why. Because of this, it is a bad theory. A better theory would give a deeper 
justification. Still, this shows how it can be coherent to posit a particular 
normative truth as basic, as lacking a deeper justification, even when it is in 
need of one. 
There is an analogy for this in science: it is possible for a theory to take 
something as basic, lacking a need for explanation. Van Frassen gives several 
illuminating examples: 
‘We also reject such questions as the Aristotelians asked the Galileans: why 
does a body free of impressed forces retain its velocity?...Clark Maxwell 
accepted as legitimate the request to explain electromagnetic phenomena 
within mechanics. As his theory became more and more accepted, scientists 
ceased to see the lack of this as a shortcoming. The same had happened with 
Newton’s theory of gravitation…In both cases there came a stage at which 
such problems were classed as intrinsically illegitimate, and regarded exactly 
as the request for an explanation of why a body retains its velocity in the 
absence of impressed forces…the important fact for the theory of explanation 
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is that not everything in a theory’s domain is a legitimate topic for why-
questions: and that what is, is not determinable a priori.’43 
It is possible, then, to theorise away a burden of explanation. But likewise, it 
is possible to theorise them into existence. An interesting example within the 
normative realm, of introducing a burden of justification, arises from the 
demands of freedom. Rawls claims: 
‘A…respect in which citizens view themselves as free is that they regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims. That is, they regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conception of the good.’44 
For Rawls, if citizens make claims on institutions to advance their conception 
of the good, and those institutions refuse, a burden of justification arises on 
institutions to be able to justify this refusal: why may they refuse rather than 
not? For one cannot gratuitously throw out valid claims. So this is an example 
of a theory positing a special burden of justification that goes beyond the 
common ground present in generic contrastive burdens of explanation. In this 
way, it is a mistake to think that a common ground is a necessary condition 
for there to be a contrastive burden of justifications: it is a normal condition, 
but nothing rules out our positing another source of contrastive burdens of 
justification. 
We have now explored the origins of contrastive burdens of justification and 
seen to when they may also fail to hold. However, we have not yet addressed 
the question of how far this account can be extended. While it is clear that 
there are genuine contrastive burdens of justification, it is not yet clear that 
all genuine burdens of justification are contrastive in nature. There are two 
kinds of cases in particular that are of interest. The first concerns implicit 
contrasts: cases where a burden of justification is posed without an explicit 
contrast, but where a contrast must be recovered from the context and 
information about the likely interests of the inquirer. The second concerns 
global contrasts: cases where we want to know if overall there is an adequate 
                                                          43 P.111-2, ibid. 
44 Rawls (2005) Political Liberalism, part 1, lecture 1, part 5: The political conception of the person, section 3. 
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justification for a topic. Both of these cases are legitimate questions, and the 
task facing my account of normative justification is to construe these 
legitimate questions in terms of other legitimate questions that are acceptable 
to the contrastive theory of justification. 
As the name suggests, the key to dealing with cases of implicit contrast is to 
impute a hidden contrastive structure to the explicit burden of justification. 
Here is an example of a burden of justification with only an implicit contrast: 
it is election time and I am wondering if I should vote for a particular 
candidate—let’s call that candidate Dean. This is a burden of justification on 
whether I should vote for Dean with no explicit contrast. An implicit contrast 
can be imputed easily enough: what I am wondering is, for each other 
candidate, why it should be that I should vote for Dean instead of its being 
the case that I should vote for that other candidate. Finally, what requires 
justifying is that I should vote for Dean instead of not voting at all, or spoiling 
my ballot. The burden of justification as to whether I should vote for Dean is 
equivalent to all of these other ones put together. I suspect that the lesson here 
can be applied fairly generally: where the contrast must be implicit if present 
at all, the implicit contrasts tend to be incompatible and wide-ranging. 
Global contrasts are much more interesting, where the burden of justification 
for a topic is unrestricted: what we are wondering is whether the topic can be 
fully justified. Global contrasts too can be implicit, and sometimes it is 
difficult to discern whether a burden of justification presented without an 
explicit contrast has an implicit global contrast, or a more restricted implicit 
contrast. This is not a philosophical question so I shall not pursue it further. 
It does bring out an important point, though: there is no ordinary language 
notion of a global contrast. A question arises over whether I should vote for 
Dean, but that can be interpreted as a non-global contrast as I did above. So 
even in asking whether a particular topic is fully justified, or justified 
simpliciter, we are already in philosophical space.  
This means that we have some license to define the notion of being fully 
justified as we see fit. It follows from what I have already said that it is a 
necessary condition on a normative proposition’s being fully justified that it 
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be able to meet a contrastive burden of justification. If no response can 
ultimately be given to a burden of justification, then the topic under that 
burden is unjustified. So, for example, if no response can ultimately be given 
to the question of why plastic surgery should be dodgy but makeup not, then 
the claim that plastic surgery is dodgy is not fully justified (though one may 
have plenty of other good reasons for thinking it). 
Another question is whether it is sufficient for a normative proposition’s 
being true that it responses can ultimately be given to all of its contrastive 
burdens of explanation. If this is false, then there is an aspect of being justified 
that cannot be captured contrastively, and that would be a lacuna in my 
account. I argue that there is no aspect of being justified that cannot be 
captured contrastively, and so I argue that meeting contrastive burdens of 
justification is sufficient for a normative proposition to be justified. But this 
requires an additional proof which I will now provide. 
The proof will proceed via reductio. I assume, I hope uncontroversially, that 
being fully justified is necessary and sufficient for a normative proposition to 
be true. Hence, the outcome of the proof is that iff adequate responses can 
ultimately be given to all of a normative proposition’s contrastive burdens of 
justification, that proposition is true. 
Suppose this condition wasn’t sufficient to be fully justified. Then, there 
would be a normative proposition P such that all the contrastive burdens of 
justification its truth introduces could be adequately met, and yet P was still 
less than fully justified, and therefore false. As long as it is non-terminal, it 
could be true only if it could be fully justified.  
Since P is false, by logical equivalence, the negation of P would be true. By 
the necessary condition on full justification discussed above, all the 
contrastive burdens of justification introduced by the truth of ¬P, if there are 
any, could in turn be adequately met. All the contrastive burdens of 
justification introduced by ¬P could be met, but ex hypothesi, all the 
contrastive burdens of justification the truth of P introduces could also be 
adequately met. 
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Whenever a contrastive burden of explanation occurs and the contrast is 
compatible with the topic, the explanation of the compatible contrast will be 
at least part of the explanation of the incompatible contrast as to why the event 
happened rather than not, or why it was the case rather than not. All answers 
to contrastive questions such as ‘why did the Colonel murder the Marquis but 
not the Earl?’ will bear on the answer to the core question ‘why did the 
Colonel murder the Marquis?’. Another example: It is appropriate for the 
General to assault Fort Blue but inappropriate to assault Fort Red, though it 
is in his power to do both. This is because there are high-level targets in Blue, 
but none in Red. This explanation of a compatible contrast will also serve as 
part of the explanation for the topic (it being appropriate to assault Fort Blue) 
over its contradictory. Why it is appropriate to assault Fort Blue instead of its 
not being appropriate to do so is partly explained by the presence of high-
level targets in Fort Blue. 
It follows from this premise that where there are any contrastive burdens of 
explanation for a normative proposition, there is a burden of explanation for 
that proposition over its contradictory. It follows, then, that for P above 
(which by assumption isn’t terminal) there is a burden of explanation arising 
as to why P rather than ¬P. Likewise, there is a burden of explanation arising 
as to why ¬P rather than P. Ex hypothesi, all the contrastive burdens of 
explanation the truth of P introduces could also be adequately met, and the 
same for ¬P. Since P vs. ¬P is one of these contrastive pairs, as is ¬P vs. P, it 
follows that there is an adequate explanation for why P rather than ¬P, and 
also, an adequate explanation as to why ¬P rather than P.  
This is a contradiction. We are assuming that explanation of normative 
propositions does not proceed by probabilities. If there were, then it need not 
be a contradiction. For example, suppose that we are trying to explain why an 
unstable atom decays after more than one minute: it has a 50% chance of 
doing so. Why should it decay before one minute? Again, it has a 50% chance 
of doing so. If both of these are reckoned to be adequate explanations, then 
this would suffice as a case where we could adequately explain both why P 
rather than ¬P, and also why ¬P rather than P. But since I assumed in chapter 
1 that normative truths do not ever work like this, then we can conclude that 
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it is impossible for there to be both an adequate explanation as to why P rather 
than ¬P, and also as to why ¬P rather than P. Because it is a contradiction, the 
original assumption must be false. Therefore, iff adequate responses can 
ultimately be given to all of a normative proposition’s contrastive burdens of 
justification, that proposition is fully justified (which is sufficient for its 
truth). 
This completes my discussion of burdens of justification/explanation for 
normative propositions. All burdens of justification/explanation for 
normative propositions are contrastive in nature. The existence of contrasts to 
a given topic seems to require a condition that there is a common ground 
between it and the topic, where the common ground is part of what explains 
the truth of the topic. This allows for a certain kind of basic normative truth, 
over and above that kind of basic truth which is posited by theory. In the next 
chapter I will look at what answers are to this kind of burden of justification, 
and in particular how this suggests we should conceive of reasons and their 
relations to each other. 
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Contrastive Explanation in the Structure of Justification 
 
In this chapter I will pursue further the idea of justification as contrastive 
explanation outlined in the last chapter. In this chapter I will explore the 
nature of reasons, but reasons conceived in the light of this conception of 
justification. I will argue that we should see reasons themselves as a kind of 
explanation, as those things which can lift the contrastive burdens of 
justification. 
Sometimes a single reason can by itself be a completely adequate 
justification. We shouldn’t jump off the Eiffel Tower without a parachute for 
the single reason that it will kill us. That single reason is all that’s needed. 
Sometimes an adequate justification is formed by multiple reasons: we should 
give to charity because by doing so we help victims, and also because we 
develop our own benevolent sensibilities by doing so. Reasons, then, are 
sometimes justifications, and sometimes are parts of or elements in a 
justification. I take this as a datum, and I aim to account for it. 
In the last chapter I argued that a burden of justification always featured a 
contrast class as a parameter. So we can conceive of a justification as 
whatever answers to a particular burden of justification. Putting this together 
with the datum expressed in the paragraph above, it follows that sometimes a 
burden of justification can be answered by a single reason, and sometimes a 
burden of justification can be answered by a justification composed of 
multiple reasons. 
An example of the former is the following. Take the burden of justification: 
why is exercising a good thing, rather than morally indifferent? An adequate 
justification for this is that exercising greatly improves one’s life expectancy. 
That it improves it is a reason for exercise’s being good. The reason is the 
justification, which is that which answers the contrastive burden of 
justification. 
An example of the latter is the following. Take the burden of justification: 
why is it wrong, rather than morally indifferent, to waste a government 
  71  
student subsidy not doing any work? An adequate justification for this, in my 
opinion, is that it is objectionable on a personal and political level: personal 
because doing so neglect’s one’s own talents, and political because doing so 
undermines the general political will to keep such subsidies going when this 
will is worth preserving. Here the justification is that which answers the 
contrastive burden of justification, but the justification is composed of 
multiple reasons. 
In some kinds of multiple-reason cases, the justification is overdetermined. 
For example, it is wrong to gratuitously start a fire in someone’s house 
because it will both destroy their home and also waste the attention of the 
authorities who might be saving someone else’s home in the meantime. Both 
of these is an adequate justification on its own for the wrongness of the act: 
even if the other was not an issue, it would still be wrong to do it as long as 
one of them was in place. We can think of this as a case where there are 
multiple justifications for the same truth. 
Other multiple-reasons cases are most perspicuously construed as a 
combination of distinct goods. For example, it is wrong to waste a 
government student subsidy not doing any work, because of the personal 
neglect and the political ill consequences. Perhaps if either of these was 
absent and the other present, then it wouldn’t be strictly wrong to waste a 
subsidy but rather merely objectionable. So we should think of this as a case 
where the justification for the wrongness is the combination of the distinct 
goods/bads. So there is one and only one reason, but that reason has an 
interesting internal structure. 
Finally, there are multiple-reasons cases where each of the reasons appears to 
be doing distinct work. Say I should make myself quinoa salad as my dinner 
tonight. Perhaps an adequate justification for this is that it’s particularly 
healthy, and I’ll be hungry. That I’ll be hungry establishes that I should eat 
something. That quinoa salad is healthy establishes that that I should eat it. 
It’s not the case that I should eat quinoa salad even if I’m not hungry. 
We can think of this as a case where there are multiple burdens of 
justification, and each reason answers to its own burden of justification. The 
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overall burden of justification is: why should I eat quinoa salad as my dinner 
tonight, rather than not eat anything as my dinner? There are two burdens of 
justification contained within this one: why should I eat dinner tonight rather 
than not; and why should I eat quinoa salad for dinner rather than something 
else? That I’ll be hungry establishes that I should eat something for my dinner 
tonight. That quinoa salad is particularly healthy establishes that I should eat 
it for my dinner tonight rather than something else. The contrastive view of 
burdens of explanation, then, enables us to divide up the justificatory work in 
this way. 
If this treatment of these various cases are correct, then we can simply 
construe reasons as being themselves justifications: justifications which 
answer particular burdens of explanation with their particular contrast classes. 
That was so in each of the above cases we encountered. This gives us a very 
simple equivalence. 
One consequence of this equivalence is that normative reasons require a fact 
or facts which serve as the reason, and cannot rest on a false proposition. This 
is because a reason is a justification, a justification is an explanation, and an 
explanation requires a fact or facts which serve as an explanation. If the 
Colonel did not possess a gun, and knew it, then it cannot be part of the 
explanation of how he murdered the Marquis that he knew he could shoot him 
and avoid a precarious swordfight. In the same way, if quinoa salad isn’t 
healthy, I can’t justify my eating it from its being healthy. So we might think 
of this as an explanation of why reasons require facts: reasons require facts 
because reasons are explanations and explanations require facts. Sometimes 
reasons and explanations utilise things rather than facts, as when we say that 
the explanation of Britain’s temperate climate is the Gulf Stream, or when 
one ought to refrain from bullying people because of the pain it causes them. 
A similar point applies here: the things which serve as the reason or 
explanation must exist. If there were no Gulf Stream, it couldn’t possibly 
serve as an explanation of Britain’s temperate climate. Similarly for 
normative reasons. 
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With this equivalence in hand, we can address the problem I raised through 
Ross in chapter 2. There, I argued that the paradigmatic problem of construing 
the role of reasons was that in some cases there are multiple reasons in play 
which genuinely conflict, in the sense that they recommend competing 
verdicts and the conflict is not internally resolvable, yet in at least some of 
those cases, the conflict between the reasons is resolvable nonetheless: there 
is a fact of the matter as to what the correct verdict is. The challenge, then, is 
to say in virtue of what the conflict is resolvable. It was by addressing a 
challenge of this kind that a weighing model appeared to gain traction. 
Given that reasons are explanations, there are actually two problems here. 
One is how there can be reasons in favour of something that isn’t true. For 
example, the possibility of taking it easy is a reason in favour of its being 
permissible to waste a government student subsidy doing no work, but still, 
because of the other things at stake, it’s not actually permissible to do so. 
There can’t be explanations of something that isn’t true or that didn’t happen: 
if there is no food, then no sense can be made of a putative explanation of 
why there is lots. There can be no such explanation. So one problem is how 
reasons can do this, given that reasons are explanations, and explanations 
can’t do this. We must acknowledge this problem just so long as we 
acknowledge the above kind of case: cases where there are conflicting reasons 
one of which counts in favour of the truth a proposition that isn’t in fact true. 
The second problem is the more traditional one: showing how that conflict 
could be resolvable, given that there can be conflicting reasons. 
I will address the first problem first: if reasons are explanations, and there can 
be reasons in favour of false propositions, this entails that there are 
explanations of things that aren’t true: and this appears to be an absurd 
consequence. 
Instead, we should refine the equivalence of reasons and explanations. Instead 
of saying that reasons are explanations, we should think of reasons as items 
which would explain a normative truth were it a genuine truth. For example, 
the tedium of exercise is a reason in favour of the truth of the proposition that 
I am ill-advised to do it. What this means is: were it true that I am ill-advised 
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to exercise, one thing that at least partially explains this is the tedium of 
exercise. Putting this schematically: a reason in favour of P would explain P 
were P true (and does explain P if P is actually true). 
An interesting objection to this is the following. Some think that normative 
truths are necessary, at least when shorn of all their empirical addons45 (I 
don’t mean to endorse this; rather, an interesting objection emerges if it is 
true). It is not hard to see the appeal of this view. It doesn’t seem that it could 
be true, or that it could have been true, that torturing animals for fun is 
permissible. So it seems to be a necessary truth. The problem with necessary 
truths is that they result in impossible antecedents when counterfactualized. 
And from an impossible antecedent anything follows (though of course not 
everything follows from a necessary antecedent). So to say of a normative 
proposition P that if it were true, X would explain it, therefore implies that, 
necessarily, in the case were P is in fact necessarily false, if it were true X 
would explain it. Since the antecedent is impossible, it’s trivially true that if 
P were true X would explain it, for any X. So anything at all could explain P 
were it true, and so anything at all counts as a reason for it, by my definition 
of a reason. So we have the consequence that absolutely everything is a reason 
for torturing animals for fun. What a disastrous result. 
Something must have gone wrong with the metaphysics or the logic here. 
Still, I do not think we have to deny the necessity of norms in order to hold 
on to our counterfactual definition of a reason. There are conditionals with 
impossible antecedents that aren’t trivially true. Whatever account is to be 
given of such conditionals can simply be exported to the normative case.  
A nice example of a non-trivially true conditional with an impossible 
antecedent can be found in the mathematical/computer science problem P vs 
NP. This problem concerns whether for certain mathematical problems where 
putative solutions can be quickly verified, there is a quick algorithm for 
finding those solutions. My understanding is that the consensus is that there 
is no quick algorithm for finding those solutions, though a proof of this has 
not yet been discovered. So why is there a consensus? The idea is that if there 
                                                          45 E.g. p.31 of Thomson (1990) 
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were a quick algorithm for finding these solutions, it would have been 
discovered by now. No quick algorithm has been discovered by now. 
Therefore, there is none. The major premise in this syllogism is the 
conditional: if there were a quick algorithm, it would have been discovered 
by now. It is believed that the antecedent is necessarily false. But since the 
whole conditional is meant to be serious evidence for a mathematical truth, 
the whole conditional can’t be trivially true. So this is an example of a non-
trivially true conditional with an impossible antecedent. I expect that 
whatever account can be given of this is one that I can use with respect to 
reasons. 
Now we can turn to the second, more central problem. The reasons for a 
normative proposition P are those that would explain P were P true, and the 
reasons against P are those that would explain P’s falsity, were P false. But 
reasons are supposed to tell us whether a normative proposition is true or not: 
normative propositions are supposed to be justified on the basis of the 
reasons. As it stands, then, my definition of reasons does not give us any tools 
with which to resolve deadlock. 
At the end of the last chapter, I proved that it is sufficient for a non-terminal 
normative proposition to be fully justified (and hence true) that an adequate 
response can be given to all of its contrastive burdens of justification. The 
problem above is posed in terms that make clear that each of the competing 
propositions in question, P and ¬P, are non-terminal: if they are true, then 
their truth can be given a deeper explanation with reference to some other 
truths. If they are non-terminal, they are therefore subject to the proof. Since 
it cannot be that both are true, it cannot be that both are fully justified. Hence 
it cannot be that all the contrastive burdens of justification for both can be 
met. 
This resolves the deadlock. Where there are reasons for competing normative 
propositions, then only one can be fully justified and hence true. That one is 
marked by its ability to meet all of its contrastive burdens of justification. 
This ability to meet all contrastive burdens of justification is what resolves 
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the deadlock. The conflict is resolved in favour of the proposition which can 
meet all of its burdens of justification. 
Let’s see how this goes in an example. Regular exercise increases one’s life 
expectancy and improves one’s immune system. These are reasons to do it, 
but more importantly reasons in favour of the truth of the proposition that one 
should do it, in some relatively undemanding sense of ‘should’. Regular 
exercise, however, is tedious. That is a reason not to do it, but more 
importantly a reason in favour of the truth of the proposition that one 
shouldn’t do it, again in an undemanding sense of ‘should’. 
It is in fact true that one should exercise. Why? What explains why one should 
exercise, rather than not, is that exercising increases one’s life expectancy and 
improves one’s immune system. If it were true that one shouldn’t exercise, 
the tedium of exercise might explain this. But what explains why one should 
in fact exercise regularly rather than not is that it increases one’s life 
expectancy and improves one’s immune system. The tedium of exercise fails 
to explain why one shouldn’t exercise rather than not. The former case 
explains all of its contrastive burdens, whereas the latter doesn’t. 
Clearly this is completely uninformative, and indeed it fails to answer the 
question of how the deadlock gets resolved. What we want to know is why 
an improved life expectancy and immune system, together, should establish 
that one should exercise regularly, rather than the tedium of exercise 
establishing the opposite. Both are genuine reasons, after all. 
At last this gives us the real burden of justification, and it is important to 
notice how it adheres to the hallmarks of burdens of justification established 
in the last chapter. There is a common ground: there are genuine reasons on 
both sides of the argument. There are contrasting effects: one set of reasons 
establishes the conclusion it favours, while the set of reasons in favour of the 
opposite conclusion fails to establish it. The burden of justification itself has 
an explicitly contrastive form: why the one set of reasons should establish the 
conclusion it favours, while the other fails to.  
So let’s pursue the example down this road: we are to find a relevant 
difference between the tedium of exercise, on the one hand, and the prospect 
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of an improved life expectancy and immune system, on the other, which 
explains the difference in effect. Perhaps there are many relevant differences: 
let’s focus on one for the sake of space. One can easily learn to cope with 
tedium, but a diminished life expectancy and immune system are near-
irreparable losses (life expectancy in particular). So that’s why the prospect 
of an improved life expectancy and immune system should establish that one 
should exercise regularly, while in contrast, the tedium of exercise should fail 
to establish that one shouldn’t. 
Reasons are explanations and explanations of normative truths work 
contrastively. So reasons are themselves contrastive. To say that the tedium 
of exercise is a reason that counts in favour of the truth of the proposition that 
I shouldn’t do it, is to say that if it were true that I shouldn’t exercise, then its 
tedium explains why I shouldn’t rather than should. Furthermore the tedium 
of exercise would explain why I shouldn’t exercise in contrast more generally 
to activities which aren’t tedious, and where it’s not the case where I shouldn’t 
do them. Listening to music isn’t (for the most part) tedious, for example, and 
it’s not something I shouldn’t do. Suppose we thought we shouldn’t exercise, 
then a burden of justification might arise over why I shouldn’t exercise but it 
is OK to listen to music. The tedium of exercise would then lift this burden. 
It is worth outlining in succession the abstract differences between this view 
of the structure of justifications and the view of that structure that is contained 
in the idea of the weighing model. There are three principal differences. First, 
in that view the weightiest set of reasons established its conclusion. Since 
every reason has a positive weight, it follows that in cases where there is one 
reason in favour of P and no reason against P, then P. There is no such 
condition in my account: a reason is at least part of a justification for P, but 
where it is only part of a justification for P, and there are no other reasons, 
then there is no justification for P. Hence it is not a condition on being a reason 
that that reason establishes its conclusion unless it is defeated by other 
reasons. Perhaps there can be a version of a weight-based framework where 
this condition is modified, so this does not mark out a universal difference. 
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Second, if a reason has a certain weight or if it is weightier than another 
reason(s), this is something that has to be justified. But in contrast, on my 
account what has to be justified is only the complete relation of why some set 
of reasons should establish the conclusion it favours while a competing set of 
reasons fails to establish the conclusion it favours. So there is a shift in the 
burden of justification. 
Thirdly, my account is not outwardly deductive. It does not deductively 
follow from the fact that a diminished life expectancy and immune system are 
near-irreparable losses, whereas doing something tedious isn’t, that the 
former two establish that one should exercise regularly whereas the latter 
doesn’t. Whereas, if these were associated with certain weights and were 
weightier than the latter, it would deductively follow that one should exercise 
regularly. 
One thing this discussion should have brought out is that the proposition that 
X is a reason in favour of P is itself normative. As such it is open to the same 
kind of demand for justification as any other normative proposition. For 
example, we might imagine a worker who notices that whenever they are 
struggling with work, their boss is indifferent, while whenever a particular 
co-worker is struggling with work, their boss is eager to help. The following 
complaint to the boss makes sense: why should their co-worker’s travails 
count as a reason for the boss to help them, while their own travails don’t? 
This is a clear case of a burden of justification introduced by contrasting 
normative propositions, one which reasons are required to ameliorate. 
Not only is the identification of reasons itself normatively contentious and 
open to the same kinds of justificatory demands as other normative 
propositions; burdens of justification also arise between situations where 
there are similar reasons at play and yet different normative verdicts are 
assigned. For example, suppose General X is deciding which enemy 
fortification to attack out of A and B. In favour of A is its coastal location 
which makes it a natural base for resupply and reinforcements. In favour of 
B is its symbolic importance in terms of the war objective; capturing it will 
raise morale and may lead to an earlier end to the war. Suppose General X 
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decides that he should attack B. Earlier X faced a similar decision as to where 
to attack where the candidates were two different enemy fortifications, C and 
D. As with A and B, C is coastal whereas D is symbolically important. 
Suppose X had decided to attack C in the earlier decision scenario. Now a 
burden of justification arises: why is B a worthier target than A, but C 
worthier than D, given that the reasons that bear on each situation are the 
same? And this burden can only be met by introducing an additional 
difference between the two scenarios which would explain the contrasting 
selection of targets. This difference would, of course, just disrupt the original 
analogy between the two scenarios. 
Contrastive justifications intrinsically relate two separate scenarios and 
explain the difference between them: this is in their very form. In this way 
contrastive justifications count as an intrinsically systematic kind of ethical 
thought. We should think of this as a strength of the theory: it accounts for 
the natural tendency to think of ethics as relatively systematic. Even those 
who are skeptical about wholly or narrowly systematic ethical theory still 
acknowledge that ethics is to some extent inherently systematic. For instance, 
Bernard Williams writes: 
‘A limited benevolent or altruistic sentiment may move almost anyone to think that he should act in a certain way on a given occasion, but that fact does not present him with the ethical…The ethical involves more, a whole network of considerations…’46 
And Williams acknowledges the intuitive force of the contrastive demand for 
further explanation of contrasting ethical judgements where the cases are 
supposedly similar: 
‘[Someone is] inconsistent and irrational, if he counts intelligence and reliability as supposedly sufficient grounds for hiring a man and refuses to do so when considering a woman.’47 
A second advantage of my account is that it can account for the platitude 
mentioned in the last chapter that explanation enables understanding of what 
is explained. We can do this via relatively loose ideas of distinctiveness. 
Understanding why a truth holds is knowing what is distinctive of the truth, 
                                                          46 P.28 of Williams (2011), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
47 P.128, ibid. 
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or a particular type to which it belongs, in virtue of which it should hold. For 
example, to understand why it should be true that breaking promises is wrong 
it is at least sufficient to understand the nature of promises and how this 
contributes to promises’ being morally distinctive. 
Because the way in which a given case contrasts with others is written into 
the very form of a contrastive reason-explanation, contrastive reason-
explanations disclose the way in which their normative subject-matter is 
distinctive. For example, take the variety of contrastive questions that would 
arise in the case of deciding whether to vote for a particular candidate in a 
parliamentary election. Answering all those would involve knowing what all 
the relevant differences between the candidates were, the relevant differences 
between general elections and other types, and so on. Because giving a full 
contrastive explanation of why a particular normative truth holds contributes 
to knowing what is distinctive about its subject-matter, this makes clear how 
understanding the explanation yields understanding of the phenomenon. 
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